THIS ANALYSIS IS LARGELY OBSOLETE BY 2018.
For analysis reasons I will let it here, however if anybody needs more indications he can contact me at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Table of contents
- Operation Euphrates Shield, Syria
- Details about Leopard 2s in Syria
- Leopard 2s on the stage
- Does the cat have a thick fur?
- Final analysis and recommendations
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In this analysis we are going to have a closer look at the performance of the Turkish Leopard 2A4TR tanks in Syria, to do that we are going to know the machine itself, the doctrine and the environment where it has operated and other things thanks to a very detailed OSINT analysis.
In 2005 Turkey acquired 298 second-hand Leopard 2A4s from Germany, later those were called Leopard 2A4TRs and they have just a slight difference in comparison with the originals, that is the addition of improved air filters, something very important for the dusty terrain generally faced in the Middle East.
Operation Euphrates Shield, Syria
At the end of August 2016 Turkey launched an offensive with rebel groups from FSA at the north of Syria mainly against the Islamic State but with an eye kept on the Kurdish.
At first M-60Ts were deployed but after some time of rumors and Leopard 2s near the Syrian frontier on the 8th of December 2016 the first batch of Leopard 2A4TRs were seen near the town of Al-Bab firing its guns against ISIS VBIEDs.
In theory a few armored and mechanized units probably totalizing no more than two brigades were deployed in Syrian territory, but deployed is not the same as used in the offensive, because it was the FSA infantry and technicals who normally led the attack what resulted in a new hybrid warfare mixture for the Turkish army.
First of all Syrians speak Arabic, while Turkish speak Turkish even using different alphabets so the communication was not very fluent what is very important if you want to take advantage of the firepower that tanks and artillery offer, also there was lack of training and morale among FSA because this group was mainly comprised of men recruited from refugee camps in Turkey with a fickle morale to fight.
Finally but not less important as Russia or USA have done in Syria the Turkish do not use their conventional units as the bulk of the force, in spite of that they stay in reserve and just some support units are sent to the front, this is important because it means that they are far away from exploiting their full offensive potential in the battlefield.
Let’s see what Heinz Guderian, the father of the so called Blirzkrieg can tell us from his book Achtung-Panzer! first published in Germany on 1937.
«This force [in reference to armored forces and tanks] that actually has the biggest offensive power has also the right to use this power under its own rules, and so anywhere it is empoyed it will be the main force and the others will depend on them »
The tank is normally the central piece of the ground warfare but to fully exploit its firepower, mobility and protection it must have an accompanying force to reach all the possbilities that it offers.
If a high intensity campaign would have been done against ISIS the mechanized or armored forces would have been comprised of the next accompanying elements: Mechanized infantry, engineers, self-propelled artillery and air support, all of them used at the same time, in high numbers and at the key points of the ISIS defenses to break their lines and continue the advance cutting their rearguard until Raqqa, but this has never happen, but why? Because as we said Turkey is acting like Russia or the USA and they just do not want to do that kind of high intensity but also high losses warfare, in spite of that they prefer to use their tanks as a mere support for the FSA avoiding to use them in the attack to deeply penetrate ISIS lines alongside a combined arms force.
This is the first main reason for the Leopard 2A4s losses in Syria, they are not being used as tanks must be used, they can not be just mobile guns to support rebels because for that purpose a cheap T-55 captured from SAA depots or even a technical would be nearly as useful as an expensive Leopard 2.
But what else did Heinz Guderian told us 80 years ago? Let’s have a look:
«The rights claimed result in the next tactical needs:
- Massive employ
- Suitable terrain»
Surprise was not reached in Al Bab and in fact it is the opposite, the Turkish low profile performance letting most of the weight of the fight to fall on the FSA and doing just a slow advance was not going to result in any surprise.
The massive employ was not reached because tanks were used in small units, normally just platoons of three or four tanks and sometimes even individually.
Suitable terrain, the only thing that did not depended on the Turkish High Command was given by the nature of the Syrian terrain with a lot of plains and ground with just some snow during the winter.
Teacher Guderian said «The high speed of the armored attack is essential to determine the results of the combat»
Most of all of the basic rules about the use of armored forces were not applied by Turkish military planners probably due to political pressure to avoid losses and because the chief of the operation, the Lieutenant general Zekai Aksakallı is from SF so he is not very familiar with the usage of armored forces.
So what was the only way of use of the Leopard 2A4TRs in Syria? Just go to one position overlooking the area and give some fire support with the help of a link officer between the FSA and the tanks or just by the own capabilities of the steel monsters.
The lack of ground reconnaissance and link with the rebels ultimately led to the Leopard 2A4 crews to take some bad deccissions and place their tanks at vulnerable positions, those ones were observated by ISIS and its experienced tank hunter units equipped with ATGMs that ultimately were able to hit the MBTs on the exposed flanks.
While we will have a closer look about protection in the section «Does the cat have a thick fur?» first of all we want to point a few things.
Most of the missiles that hit the Leopard 2s probably were 9M113 Konkurs that attacked from the flanks, anyone with some knowledge about this subject knows that there is no modern MBT able to resist these kind of missiles at the sides if they have no ERA or cage armor attached. Apart from that German designers relied in isolate the most sensible compartments that could led to a catastrophic explosion in case of perforation, especially thinking about fuel and ammunitions.
If a tank like a Leopard 2A4 get an ATGM impact on the side the damages are unavoidable but limitable thanks to automatic fire supression systems, heavily protected ammunition boxes, fireproof garments for the crew etc At this point we can say that Leopard 2A4 resisted well those terrible impacts taking in to account that heavy damages are mostly unavoidable in a situation with these characteristics.
Details about Leopard 2s in Syria
Before being sent to the frontline most of the Leopard 2s were painted with a new arid scheme camouflage but a few Leopard 2s even maintain their old green scheme as we can see in the images.
While Syria is in general a dry country the north gets some snow and very low temperatures during the coldest months of the winter but in fact that is not a problem for the Leopard 2s that are very well suited for low temperatures.
Also the Leopard 2 can mount a 7,62 mm MG-1 or MG-3 on the turret in front of the commanders hatch, those MGs tend to use an AA sight but in this case it wouldn’t have sense for Turkish crews and so they probably use the normal sights. This machine gun is especially famous because of its deadly rate of fire around 1.200 bullets per minute. However it is a feature that we have seen just in a few cases while most of the turret MGs have been removed.
About the ammunition used, as far as what has been released we have seen M325 HEAT-MP-T (Multipurpose Tracer) rounds along with advanced Turkish (MKEK) copy of the KE German rounds DM-43 or DM-53 and Israeli KE APFSDS M322 or M328.
- KE or APFSDS – Kinnetic Energy (Only against very well protected targets)
- HEAT – High Explosive Anti Tank (Multipurpose)
- HE – High Explosive (only against soft targets)
In theory the DM-43s or DM-53s of the last group of images don’t exactly match with a German produced round, in our opinion those are DM-43 or DM-53 rounds produced by MKEK because we have find 120 mm APFSDS-T KE rounds produced by MKEK as we can see on the image below, but these rounds do not appear in the MKEK webpage.
The use of HE and HEAT rounds should be the rule in Syria as far as they are the best suited to deal with personal behind field fortifications or walls, and the HEAT can even engage some armor that ISIS could rarely deploy, like BMP-1s or certain outdated tanks.
The KE APFSDS are penetrators designed to pass through the armor of advanced tanks like T-72s or T-90s and they are no effective against buildings, technicals or lightly armroed vehicles, for example during 1991 Desert Storm we saw that M829 or M829A1 KE rounds were able to penetrate from side to side of a T-72 and left the tank without destroy anything, so if they can go across all the vehicle and get out whithout affecting it, why deploy them in Syria?
As we all know ISIS has been making a massive use of SVBIEDs mounted in armored civilian vehicles moving at high speed, those are pretty destructive and difficult to hit targets while HEAT and HE projectiles could deal with VBIEDs armors their trajectories are much parabolic because of their lower muzzle velocity in comparison with KE rounds which are around 1.600 m/s in comparison with around 1.000 m/s of HEAT or HE rounds.
This is important for several reasons, for example the DM-53 (KE) is much faster than the M325 (HEAT) and so it has a much more flat and easy to aim trajectorie what leads to a higher level of accuracy and rate of fire both very important capabilities to deal with VBIEDs. But at this point the sharpest might argue that as I have said before this rounds tend to penetrate all the armor and leave the vehicle without cause any important damage, while this is true we must remember that VBIEDs are loaded with huge amounts of explosives and so the probability that the projectile hits one of them during the perforation is very high.
In most world doctrines including the Turkish, tank platoons are comprised of 4 tanks each with one leading tank, however sometimes some especial forces use platoons of three tanks each, this is for example more typical in expeditionary forces like marines or naval infantry units.
What is strange is that at some point we have observed what appears to be Turkish tank units of 3 tanks each while it would have sense because you do not need to mass a lot of vehicles to fight ISIS but rather be flexible with the vehicles you have, but anyway we are far from absolutely sure about this point.
Leopard 2s on the stage
Almost all of the fighting where the Leopard 2s have been involved was linked to the battle for Al-Bab town, and especially about the clashes for its hospital located at the west of the town.
For recovery purposes the main vehicle is the M88A1 originally based on the M-48/M-60 powerplants, while the A1 is an improved version with a more powerful engine.
We do not know the numbers of M88A1s deployed but what is sure is that they have not done or they have not been able to do a good job at certain times, because we have been able to see how Leopard 2A4s destroyed or heavily damaged were not recovered event a mptnh after the event, what says a lot about coordination and maybe about the ISIS pressure in the area.
At the moment we have been able to verify the existence of 43 Leopard 2A4TRs deployed in Syria along two batches: The first one was comprised of 18 tanks that were seen on 8/12/2016 while the second batch included 25 tanks that were sent on 10/12/2016 this numbers suggest a deployed force equivalent to an armored brigade and as Christian Triebert published in Bellingcat the license plates of the Leopard 2s corresponded to the 2nd Armored Brigade from the First Army.
But how are they normally operated?
Normally they fire from hastily constructed field fortifications originally intended for the infantry and built with soil walls, they are not specifically designed for tanks because otherwise they would have much higher walls covering their sides and fronts. If they would have enough time and resources they would have dug firing positions for the tanks because those protect them much more than those walls made with soil.
We have not seen any well prepared dig in fire position for the tanks what suggests a low participation and low coordination with engineer units who would have build much better positions an effort that in the end could have saved a lot of vehicles and crews.
Look at the images above and just compare the levels of protection offered by the fortifications done in both firing positions for tanks, on the left one a M1 Abrams during some drills, on the right one a Leopard 2A4TR in Syria.
Normally Leopard 2s stay behind the soil walls and provide fire support from positions overlooking ISIS territory and firing the main guns and the coaxial machine guns, however we do not know their level of coordination with the FSA.
We also think that apart from the own abilities of the tank, the Turkish are using their Cobra OTOKAR light wheeled vehicles to support fire control of the MBTs during the operations, this technique is also used by other armies like for example the French AMX-56s along the VBLs.
It is also interesting to note that there are a lot of photos of Turkish soldiers with relatively rare and specialized weapons like the AIAW sniper rifle posing with the Leopards, these kind of rifles would be just used in very specialized sniper units particularly from the SFs a kind of forces that you would not normally expect to be operating with armored units, this gives us an idea about how hybrid the warfare is where the Turkish Leopard 2s are acting.
As the Leopard 2s are normally acting as mere means of fire support and not as part of purely offensive and advancing forces they are not probably expected to need fire support and so probably the artillery and mainly the 155 mm SPH T-155s are not acting primarily under the tank units requisitions what is always a defect.
However we are still speaking about a low-intensity operation and so the tanks deployed do not act in a normal way and in the end they are being used such as during urban fighting, that is disperse tank units and decentralize at a certain degree the command, so for example if tanks are needed at some area they do not deploy even a single squadron but just one or two tanks to provide fire support, this is because ISIS has so low numbers of troops deployed that you do not need the whole unit to be participating during the fire support phase.
While in a normal situation Turkish armored units would be coordinated with jets, helicopters, artillery and other assets, in Syria they just look to be coordinated with small units of mechanized infantry mounted on ACV-15s (a heavily improved Turkish version of the M-113 APC) that in our opinion normally act as security elements for the small tank units.
Most times the true spearhead of the OES is the FSA units supported by tanks and by the artillery provided thanks to the SFs accompaining the FSA and using recognisment technics, the air force looks to be operating both attacking predetermined objectives and providing immediate air support.
But the main problem is that the FSA that in theory is supposed to be the infantry spearhead has a different language (Arabic) a lot of times they have no experience, low moral and a low level of training, and finally they are mainly a light force without their own heavy material what in the end and in spite of the Turkish heavy material supporting them does not compensate their deficiencies.
Also it must not be underestimated the high proficiency that ISIS tank hunter units have reached in Al-Bab, a sophistication never seen before in Syria or Iraq with even simultaneous double ATGM strikes and a good coordination to attack from different sides, and a good knowledge of the terrain that has allowed them to take some advantages and produce some small but jazzy successes.
Does the cat have a thick fur?
While some have argue that the tanks were hit by TOW-2A ATGMs we find it very unlikely, first of all because throughout the war just a few TOWs have end on hands of ISIS, and secondly because ISIS has plenty of Soviet/Russian ATGMs, some of them captured and some of them bought to rebel groups.
Those ATGMs are mainly 9M111 Fagot, 9M113 Konkurs, 9M133 Kornet and 9M115 Metis, the last one depending on its variant 9M115 or 9M115-1 has a medium range from 1 to 1,5 km, also all of them work with HEAT warheads and the less powerful one is the 9M111 with a penetration capability around 400 mm of RHA.
In theory the frontal armor of the Leopard 2A4 would resist the Fagot, could resist the Metis and the Konkurs and would not resist the Kornet.
However the sides is another story, maybe at the frontal part of the sides of the Leopard 2A4 where the heavy skirts are situated we might be speaking about a 40% of the armor on the front, while in the other parts of the sides it would probably be even less.
We estimate that the armor of the chassis would be between 3 to 8 cm thick of conventional steel depending on where are we speaking while at the low part of the chassis we should add the wheels and the light skirt acting as spaced armor what adds an unknown protection, but still the most exposed parts are the sides of the turret and the high part of the chassis because there is no extra armor on both.
However Leopard 2s are designed to also protect the critical flammable or explosive components inside the tank, and overall the ammunition racks wich are protected and even every round has its own plated container.
The tank has two main ammo racks, the first one with 27 rounds storaged at the front of the chassis at the height of the gunner, that one is very well protected but it could be vulnerable to mines that hit the low glacis or beneath the hull, the other rack is at the left-back part of the turret and it has 15 ready to use rounds, these ones are by far the more exposed, especially to hits on the sides of the turret.
It is not necessary to say that every ATGM would be able to penetrate the side of the Leopard at almost any place and after the penetration just the protection measures and the luck in some way foreseen by the designers will allow the tank and its crew to survive.
Also it must be said that normally just one penetration is not able to destroy a tank but rather to cause it heavy but repairable damages including heavy wounds and even some deaths to the crew.
In the case of Syria all of the hits documented were on the right side of the Leopard 2s leading to one of the worst situations, also some tanks were captured and utterly destroyed by ISIS or by Turkish airstrikes.
Let’s have a look at the image below, it shows an absolutely annihilated Leopard 2A4, everything that could have exploited did it, but let’s have a closer look at the front of the chassis because that part is the one that has suffered more damage, for example the ammo rack of the turret has also exploited but it has not meant that the turret has been cut in to pieces, while the chassis has been. In our opinion what these evidences suggest is that such damage can just had been done by an air launched missile, in the case of the Turkish Air Force probably an AGM-65 Maverick, because the frontal chassis is very hard to destroy as it has been done in this case.
Also during the ISIS video about the captured Turkish positions with a few Leopard 2s apparently they were all well preserved and so posterior images of Leopard 2s could have been taken after those captured ones were destroyed by ISIS or the Turkish. In the end those are too complex and unknown vehicles for ISIS and they are as useless as those M1 Abrams captured by Daesh in Iraq that were later destroyed.
Disgracefully we have not been able to establish the conncetion between any of the ISIS ATGM videos and other tank photos, with the exception of the next group of images where we can see an attack on two Leopard 2A4s, thanks to Christian Triebert for help us at this point.
In this case the ATGM was more likely a Soviet 9M111, 9M113 or 9M133, at the position attacked there were two Leopard 2s and one T-155 SPH. The position was comprised of a soil wall divided in two spaces at the front where both vehicles were situated to fire, for the protection of the sides they mistakenly trusted in to a civilian wall that did not cover even the taller part of the chassis.
The after effects of the engagement can be seen on this image.
While both tanks suffered a brutal impact the second one got completely burnt off, judging the angle for the ATGM we can clearly see that the most exposed part of that tank was the rear turret, where the ready to use 120 mm rounds were placed, the weaker spot of the tank. The impact led to a catastrophic kill that probably disembogued in the death of some members of the crew.
The first tank resisted much better the impact, as we can see on the images of the strike and the images above the tank chassis was very angled and also the missile hit the heavy sideskirts what might have helped to decrease the power of the shaped charge once it entered inside the tank, while some damage and injuries may have been caused the crew still was able to turn back the turret, this hit could have also been close to affect the main 120 mm rack storage but it looks like it wasn’t able to reach it what shows why German designers added those heavy sideskirts at the flanks, to protect that side where a powerrful hit could ultimately reach the main 120 mm storeroom.
Also it is interesting to note that on the image above we can see how the upper part of the turret where the 120 mm ammo rack is has been opened, in theory this part of the tank was deisgned to blown up to direct the explosion of the cartridges outside the tank, that is why it is very typical to see that part of the Leopard 2 turret blown up in cases of penetration.
On the sequence of images ATGM 1 and ATGM 1.2 we can see the impact of a powerful 9M115-2 Metis-M medium range ATGM with a high penetration capability on the side of the Leopard 2 again a very weak spot for a powerful ATGM as the Metis-M is.
In similar hits in T-72 series tanks in Syria where the better frontal armor of the Leopard 2A4s is not an advantage because the T-72s have around 80 mm of steel in the sides probably nearly the same as the Leopard 2s, we have been able to observe that catastrophic kills are much rare in the German tanks.
Some tanks were destroyed by IEDs or mines, the fact is that normally AT mines are designed to disable the tank by destroying the tracks but not to completely blow them of, however IEDs which are «homemade» and can be produced with different amounts of explosives can be very powerful, especially if common 152 mm or 155 mm HE artillery rounds are used.
In the next image we can see a totally destroyed tank whose number plate was «195 | 526» and according to some sources it was disabled by an IED or a mine.
If we have a closer look at the paper from an unknown source that has proven itself very accurate the tanks that revceived heavy damages had a «Ağır hasarli» (heavy damage) note, while those with very light damage did not have any indication as we can see in the original paper by comparing it with those tanks in the videos released by ISIS.
But the «195 | 526» tank appeared with no damages measure and in theory it was affected by an IED or a mine, so why the images show exactly the opposite? In our opinion it is just part of the ISIS propaganda, also the turret does not look to have suffered a prolonged fire of its 120 mm ammunition but rather a huge explosion after the ammunition was taken out, what explains the lack of burning marks and how the terrorists would have placed the explosives on the floor of the tank.
In the end it is very likely that this tank suffered a mobility kill because of a mine and later ISIS was able to loot and then put some explosives inside it to prevent the Turkish from recover their cat.
For example the Leopard 2 that appears below looks to have step over an AT mine or an IED because the right track is destroyed while the other one is in well state, and also it has not caused the destruction of the tank because it would not have been able to reach the main racks, this matches with the description given about the tank with the number plate 195 | 541.
Also the next one looks like the 195 | 537 tank because in the description it was said that it was «under the wall».
In social media it is claimed that it was loaded with a bomb and the fired with a M82A1 Barret what caused its destruction.
Interestingly almost a 100% of the hits of mines, RPGs and ATGMs over the Leopard 2s happened on the right flank of the tanks, this has a lot of sense as far as the position of ISIS was in Al Bab, and Turkish tanks were approaching from the west while approximately two kilometres at the south were placed the ISIS AT positions within range to fire the long range ATGMs two kilometres inside FSA-Turkish held territory to hit the Leopard 2s that were aiming at Al-Bab letting their flanks exposed as the next image explains
Final analysis & recommendations
Improve the coordination with FSA or even mix them with mechanized units would lead to a better level of effectiveness in te battlefield while it would also help to strength the FSA forces.
A much high level of coordination with the engineers for recovery missions and to build better protected firing positions for the tanks would help a lot to prevent ISIS from detect and hit Turkish tanks, while also the Leopard 2s should take more advantage of their mobility and do not stay in the same position after a few shots it is important to speed up the fire support processes tor reduce detection, engage and fire by ISIS AT weapons against Turkish armor.
About the recovery missions they are very important because some of the tanks captured by ISIS were taken because they have small mobility problems that could have been solved by repairing them or by evacuating them from the frontline before ISIS took the position, also some destroyed tanks that should also be taken out from the battlefield were abandoned and stayed in the same places even one month after they were destroyed.
Better use of ground reconnaissance assets in this kind of low intensity hybrid warfare is vital, it is needed a major use of armored vehicles and infantry survey to find places to be attacked by the tanks in ISIS lines and to determine what firing positions are best suited to protect the tanks from ISIS AT weaponry, along with the reconnaissance the use of more anti-mine warfare equipment and even vehicles would be useful to prevent some dangerous situations.
The organization of self-destruction air units 24/7 ready to destroy enemy tanks captured by ISIS could be a good idea to prevent them to use those tanks as propaganda or give us disgusting susprises in the future.
Also some of the actions of ISIS able to take some small positions where the Leopard 2A4TRs were stationed shows a certain lack of sedulity about the security element comprised of mechanized infantry mounted in ACV-15s that should establish a strong perimeter around the tanks to prevent ISIS to sneak in to their positions something that tends to happen in hybrid warfare.
Also allocate more M88A1 recovery vehicles for the units in the front to provide them better means for recovery missions along reserves of armored units as full time quick reaction forces to counter-attack, even with support of helicopters against possible ISIS nigh raids or similar ones could be a very good idea.
All the measures told above are free or very cheap however some heavy measuers could be taken to directly protect the Leopard 2s as we are going to see.
The Turkish company ASELSAN designed a very interesting prototype based on the Leopard 2A4 called Leopard 2 NG (Next Generation) which between other things adds a lot of modular armor and a cage armor on the sides.
While Leopard 2A4 is probably protected enough against most threats at the front the sides are another story and in our opinion the addition of the Leopard 2 NG armor to the sides and some ERA could make them well protected against ISIS threats however it is unlikely that without the ERA even the Leopard 2 NG could stop a Konkurs or even less a Kornet at the sides, along with these measures the study of new better protected ammo racks even by reducing them a little could be a great idea.
Finally the addition of a LWR or a similar system to alert the crew from enemy incoming ATGMs could help to save a lot of tanks and lives.
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21 comentarios en “Achtung Leopards in Syria! Full analysis of the Leopard 2A4TR in Syria”
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Was the vulnerable ammunition in the hull ever looked into?
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The ammunition in the Hull does not have a blast door, nor a blow off top vent?
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Reblogueó esto en vara bungas.
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Reblogueó esto en Epämuodikkaita ajatuksiay comentado:
Mielenkiitoisia juttuja Leopard kaluston tappioista Syyriassa.
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Nice article but bad solution..Cca 2000 I made a modernisation of T-55 in M-55S with 105 mm L7, Superblaser 2 (Rafael)..etc..We try to penetrate tank with all Russia arsenal: kornet, metis, maljutka, etc, etc! ERA tiles were destroyed – but tank was intact..Only weak point is AT mines..but M-55S havent ammo in front..
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hi sir,ı am turkish my english is bad.. sorry for this… ı want to add new and other information for your article, abdulkadir dirmilli he was a tank crew (probably gunner) in the hitted leopard2a4 ,he says «always one isis sniper harass our soldiers and that day was more isis sniper harass us and we took orders from our commanders and we started to search those snipers, suddenly we hitted by atgm, ı couldnt see anything everywhere was dust my commander helped me and came out the tank, we were 4 soldiers in the tank, one of the our friend heavy injured(he will good) and my left eye temporary blinded, two soldiers not injured they were healthy» he published a lot of photo and he also had a facebook profil included some photos, you must search him…. and ı watched one of the isis propaganda video, a svbied was getting closer and acv15 started to fire to isis svbied (fortified bmp) with 25mm cannon but he couldnt successful,, isis svbied too, he exploded a little away and no body died except isis suicide commando….ı have some materials for example: isis attacked a turkish point with a bmp, they are special units (called inghimasis) one of them had a action camera and it was recording.. they came out from bmp and started to fire then one of them hitted and dead and the video ended…. later a leopard2a4 coming and hit the bmp with a sabot ammonituon … please give me your e mail adress ı want to send to you some photos and videos…
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Yeah, I knew the BMP thing I am refreshing the article for a magazine.
Thanks for the information!
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Good Job. Congrats! As a former Milan ATGM Platoon Leader and Light Inf Coy Commander, I think that that a poor IPB and an underestimate of ISIS AT skills can also explain the turkish casualties. I quit Armed forces recently but my last position was head of a threat analysis center : I was often struck by people ignoring or underestimating ISIS, Al Nosra high level skills in the use of ATGM ( even if we had the Hezb example before) not only against armor but also as multi purpose «smart» light artillery…They more or less reinvented / pimped ATGM doctrine and are not inhibited by the «Anti tank» term….We must prepare ourselves and our troops to ATGM proliferation on other battlefields…
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Thank you very much for share your knowledge with all of us!
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Why not make an analysis too for the Leclerc in Yemen ?
?Porque no hablar sobre el experimento de los tanques Leclerc en Yemen tambien ?
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Maybe in the future we will think about it.
Thank you sir 😉
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«this technique is also used by other armies like for example the French AMX-56s along the VBLs.»
Just for your information. There is no such thing as «AMX56».
This expression was popularised by some journalist from Jane’s decades ago, assuming the weight of the tank was a good indicator to refer to and name it after, but it NEVER EVER was used by the french, either the manufacturer (GIAT, today Nexter) or the client, or the state.
The AMX30 was a thing. The AMX32 was a thing. The AMX40 was a thing. The AMX56 was not.
The correct term is «Char AMX Leclerc» or «Char XL», or «Char Leclerc» (or any translation of these in english of course).
Interesting read otherwise.
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Haha did not know that, still interesting.
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A few points:
“Teacher Guderian said “The high speed of the armored attack is essential to determine the results of the combat””
– Speed in this situation is not meaningfully achievable, as the attack was directed against a fortified position. ISIS had heavily garrisoned Al-Bab, was suitably equipped with anti-tank weaponry, and had erected earthwork fortifications around the town’s perimeter to further impede an assault. Simply taking the town in a sudden ‘coup de main’ was simply not feasible.
Furthermore, attempting an encirclement in the classical German fashion was not possible, owing to the constrained geography of the area, and the nearby presence of (unfriendly) SAA and Kurdish forces. Even if the TAK had managed to achieve such an encirclement, the lack of regular infantry units and the unreliability of the FSA would have made maintaining an effective cordon extremely difficult.
“This is the first main reason for the Leopard 2A4s losses in Syria, they are not being used as tanks must be used, they can not be just mobile guns to support rebels”
– I believe that, considering the circumstances, the TAK employed its armor properly. As regular Turkish infantry was not committed to the fight, it was extremely inadvisable to commit tanks to close-in fighting, where ISIS could potentially bring to bear shorter-ranged weapons such as RPG-7 / SPG-9 / M-79 Osa, etc; without proper infantry support, ISIS units could maneuver around Turkish armor, and employ hand-held weaponry against the vulnerable sides and rear of the tanks. As the FSA units involved were too disorganized and poorly-trained to provide proper infantry protection, holding back and providing fire support was perhaps the best the Turks could hope to accomplish.
Furthermore, the Leopard 2 losses around Al-Bab hospital, which were in the immediate vicinity of a built-up area, would seem to validate this. Turkish armor was not under-committed; rather, it was unwisely deployed in an area which mitigated its advantage in range and maneuverability, and which allowed ISIS to make good use of their less-sophisticated weaponry.
«an absolutely annihilated Leopard… In our opinion what these evidences suggest is that such damage can just had been done by an air launched missile, in the case of the Turkish Air Force probably an AGM-65 Maverick, because the frontal chassis is very hard to destroy as it has been done in this case.»
– This is almost certainly not the case, as this is the only similarly damaged vehicle in the photoset. Had the Turkish Air Force actually attempted to destroy the abandoned armor, they would have attacked the other derelict Leopard 2A4s nearby. Even considering the general incompetence involved in this operation, simply destroying a single vehicle would be a decision that is difficult to fathom.
Consider that ammunition explosions in the T-64 / T-72 series are sufficient to blow the turret, weighing several tons, into the air, and often seriously deforms the armored chassis of the vehicle. The secondary ammunition storage in the Leopard 2 has, when fully loaded, something close to two hundred points of propellant, to say nothing of the explosive content of HEAT or HE shells. An internal explosion would be akin to a small aircraft bomb (i.e. Mk 81 / FAB 100) going off within the vehicle, and would certainly be capable of badly damaging the chassis.
With this in mind, I believe that the ‘totally-destroyed’ vehicle was either intentionally destroyed by its crew, or suffered a penetration from an anti-tank weapon in the left-forward hull area.
«Improve the coordination with FSA or even mix them with mechanized units would lead to a better level of effectiveness in the battlefield while it would also help to strength the FSA forces.»
– This is not realistically possible, considering the disorganization and disunity of the FSA. The Syrian elements simply do not have the discipline or training to permit their integration into mechanized operations. Perhaps the best that could have been hoped for is to integrate more organic firepower in FSA units (I.e recoilless rifles, guided missiles, mortars), which would reduce the need for fire support from Turkish units.
The relative ineffectiveness of the Turkish Air Force due to post-coup purges should also be noted. Had air support, directed by embedded forward air controllers, been meaningfully available, the need to support the FSA with Turkish ground units may have been lessened.
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An encriclment was attempted without speed and surpirse but their forces were not able to take the rearguard of Al-Bab, also the choice of do not use mechanized infantry was an obvious disadvantage for the tanks that are not concived to act alone, so yeah if we assume all of those bad choices the Leopard 2s were just doing what they can, but still the performance of the Leopard 2 can not be viewed alone so we must take in to account the other normmaly «brother» elements in the battlefield.
Another bad decission that affected the Leos was the bad use of FSA and do not take actions to strength their force.
T-72s have a automatic loader at their flor with almost all the rounds so an explosion there is much powerful than one in a Western tank with much less rounds at every rack second the Leopard 2s are bigger what means more distribution of the energy of the rounds exploiting and also if you have a look at similar T-72s they are not as anihilated as that Leopard 2.
The reason why its pair was not hit by a Maverick is as simple as it was destroyed before by ISIS.
It is not about integrate them with mechanized Turkish forces but about make those accompany the FSA and act together. Also the FSA forces under ES are enough united to try something like this.
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Full list of destroyed armour in Syria (by last years). You can find 7 leopards with photo and geolocation:
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Congratulations for your work. Just a comment from me is that Leopard has the ability to create smoke curtain that prevent targeting. It is strange that we have no info whether they were used or not.
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Yeah, good point!
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Great read thanks
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Much appreciated 😀
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