A deep look at the heart of ISIS war machine: From tactics to doctrine

On this article we will have a deep look at ISIS from the military point of view and so we will analyze their structure, materials, way of fight and different tactics and tricks used by them on the battlefield.

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Table of content:

  1. ISIS in the attack
  2. ISIS on the defense
    1. Terrain, positions and dynamics
    2. Antitank defenses
    3. IEDs and mines
    4. Antiair defense
  3. Evolution: The egg wants to be a condor
  4. The individuals
    1. VBIEDs
    2. Artillery 
    3. Drones
    4. Snipers, sharpshooters and designated marksman
    5. Technicals and DIY vehicles
    6. Chemical warfare
  5. Deductions about their military organization

 ISIS in the attack

Depending on the degree of surprise foreseen by ISIS planners they may employ different tactics to assault a position and they are not tactics so far from those used by a conventional army. Most times they do a dismounted assault with fire support from technicals and sometimes spearheaded by a tank at whose back the soldiers advance, this is a very primitive tactic but still useful against low quality forces like those from Iraq and Syria are in most cases.

Another times when there is a big plain between them and their enemies and especially against Kurdish backed by a powerful air force they advance fast and supresively, this time the VBIEDs will open the way while mechanized infantry units advance mounted in DIY armored vehicles moving at top speed against enemy positions and at the same time they open suppresive fire against the enemy positions, by doing this so fast they are provoking in the enemy a panic reaction that ultimately leads to give up the position because of the fear to be surpassed, essentially this is known as a mounted attack a very risky option from the point of view of a conventional army mainly compensated by its fastness.

When they are dismounted the assault tactics of the infantry are quite typical, the main part of the weaponry consists of assault rifles either from AK or M-16 series, also a few machine guns normally from PK series are used to provide suppresive fire, hand grenades are used before rush in the enemy position or to clean close spaces, finally RPG-7s are used against fortified positions like walls, barriers or wickets.

The best units of the Caliphate also employ fire and maneuver tactics on a very basic way

The use of technicals varies a lot between different forces but normally they comprise 14,5 and 23 mm guns while sometimes they can also mount 57 mm S-60 guns or M1939 37 mm guns or even recoilless rifles.

Tanks are used as mobile shields and the infantry advances from behind also they are used for heavy and direct fire support and just under some conditions they are able to engage enemy tanks, also it is very likely that normally because of the expensive and scarce ammunition for the main gun they just use coaxial or top mounted machine guns.


The use of tanks in urban warfare has appeared just a few times in ISIS videos but maybe this is an underrepresented way of use in ISIS media because they normally record big victories and urban warfare is a slow advance one and so it doesn’t provide the glorious image that ISIS wants to present on their videos, also it must be said that the most common antitank warheads are PG-7V and PG-7VM both capabe of penetrate every T-54, T-55, T-62, Type 59 or Type 69 in Iraq or Syria with the exception of the T-55(A)MV and so use them during urban engagements is a risky option.

By knowing their armor, the protection capability that it offers and the mainly offensive spirit of the tank they normally use them during their fast attacks in the open, with especial success against the Syrian Army and their allies during flanking maneuvers to cut their rearguard and always accompanied by motorized or mechanized infantry to assault and occupy positions.

Also about the how the attack is performed they normally attack a position from multiple axes and a whole area by attacking from various sides, especially exploiting weak points in the defensive system and trying to threat the main supply routes by doing a pincer maneuver and taking advantage of the fear to be surrounded of the defenders.

During the course of the operations ISIS must be 24/7 aware of the enemy air forces and so the deployment of advanced air observers to prevent as much as possible the incoming enemy air strikes is a likely option to be used, but to be fair the best ISIS way to deal with enemy air supremacy is the use of misleading tricks against the air observation.

It is very likely that normally they move in groups as small as possible because otherwise the probability of detection and engage by enemy jets is higher but if they move in groups of just two or three cars they can be considered possible civilians and so do not be attacked, but when ISIS suffers a heavy offensive and they need to move large reinforcements in a short period of time it is unavoidable to send large convoys, when doing so they expose themselves a lot but still it is very likely that they try to move during the night when in theory air supremacy is less effective.

For what I have been told normally Daesh basic combat unit is called “Fassil” and is equivalent to a motorized squadron, it usually consists of three SUVs Toyota, one of which would be responsible for the logistic functions, this type of unit would consist of about 10 men armed with assault rifles, one or two machine guns, one rocket launcher and some hand grenades, of course ISIS is not as homogeneizated as a professional army and so this structure is not omnipresent but still this may give us a clue on how they work.

The organic addition of one logistic SUV sounds like a guerrilla evolution created when they needed high autonomy and independence on the battlefield against the US, this kind of unit might be much more difficult to locate and decide to engage by an air force and also it reduces the logistics footprint for the Caliphate, while its disadvantages would be the difficulty to concentrate and coordinate large forces in brief periods of time, but it is true that the combat environment being faced by ISIS is relatively slow and numerically low in comparison with what a conventional army would expect what compensates the disadvantages at a certain degree.

Another typical trick even used by Iraq during 1991 consists in generate big columns of smoke by burning some crtitical places with very inflammable content, also against the link officers from artillery or the air force they also burn large amounts of tires to generate a smoke screen not as dense as when a big installation is burnt but still effective for a short period of time, this kind of tactics were heavily employed when the great operation to reconquer Mosul started.

Smoke is the true AA cover of the Caliphate on the battlefield

Like the smoke Daesh tends to use the cover of sandstorms to launch large assaults and we have also seen some night raids by their best units. some of them even using silenced pistols.

Another common tactic used by ISIS is related to the use of large amounts of dummy vehicles simulating military ones, of course this is a very old trickc but it is still interesting to find it on ISIS hands. It is possible that at a certain degree the old Saddam’s officers are behind something like this because it corresponds to high intensity warfare not well known by guerrilla groups.

ISIS wood dummy vehicles simulating a T-54/55 and a Humvee

We also think that dummy vehicles are not massively used but just when they want to confuse enemy air survelliance and make them spend time and ammunition on false targets while the main operations are ongoing in other part.

It has been relatively common to see some strange large inventions consisting on a kind of big umbrella totally covering a tank, this could be used during the displacement phase to the concentration areas before being clearly detected or even during an offensive to protect them from the jets above by hidding the vehicle.

Most of these tricks are more effective against the SyAF whose airplanes most of the times are outdated and so their systems are not so capable to detect this kind of ruses.

Another common trick is related to the use of tunnels at every level, from the front to the homefront to move and store resources, to live in, to be protected from air strikes and artillery before an attack and to safely move troops from one point to another in to an area  with prepared defenses, like a village or a town.

ISIS on the defense

Terrain, positions and dynamics

The predilect ISIS defense is established in a medium size urban area with some civilian population to be used as human shields, a big net of tunnels to comunicate different key points and a well knowledge of the surroundings to avoid the enemy  to enter the town but if it happens they may have a few strongpoints well entrenched with a lot of IEDs deployed to resist.

Sometimes when they want to cover a retreat from a  position they let a few suicides at their back and they get out during the night, also I have not confirm it but it is possible that sometimes they use light forces equipped with technicals and a few ATGMs to delay the enemy and screen the movements of the main force.

ISIS understands well that the objective is not to build positions with very gross walls but rather difficult to locate because once it is known it is just a matter of time that jets, helicopters or artillery will reduce it to ashes.

Oposite to the ISIS “doctrine” has been the finding of tanks being used as pillboxes on fixed positions covered at the top by the roof of a house, while we are not sure if it was because of the lack of fuel for their tanks in our opinion it just represents a desperate decision to use a valuable tank that otherwise would be absolutely useless.

Some elements normal for every army like dig trenches, put obstacles for the vehicles, clear the fields of fire, demolish buildings to cut roads, build barriers to avoid enemy to see them or even use blankets to cover certain areas or certain gaps on tunnels are also typical of Daesh.

ISIS isn’t lame and they also use conventional field fortifications

Sometimes we have even seen them build something like petrol moats to act as fire barriers and above all again generate smoke against enemy observation both from ground and air.

The defense on open terrain is uncommon because it means huge disadvantages for them because of the lack of heavy armor, materials to build defensive lines in deepth, unexperience on that field, and exposure to enemy observation especially of the fixed positions.

We think that populated locations are their guide and reference to establish defensive positions and it is very likely from their point of view that every urban stronghold has the means to protect its position and at a certain degree its surroundings with its own material, while there must be something like “motorized reserves” by using technicals and civilian vehicles ready to be moved when one stronghold is attacked by a superior force, this may specially work in terms of ATGMs, a relatively expensive, scarce and vital weapon to defeat the core of the armored forces attacking them, however if the fight goes inside the town things would work different and evolve to something very close to an attrition battle.

While in our opinion there is not a clear way of defend by ISIS in terms of formations like a perimeter defense or a reverse slope or so in our opinion they tend to use a mix of them and specially prepare ambushes in some relatively open terrain inside the towns, in places like parks, parkings, or big buildings or complex of buildings with some open ground surrounding them.

The huge urban ambush settled by ISIS on December, 2016 at Al Salam hospital in Mosul was a big reverse to the Iraqi forces and prolonged the Mosul battle

Antitank defenses

ISIS antitank defense engagement ranges table

Green = normally used, Yellow = sometimes used, Blue = rarely used

How does ISIS engage armored forces, and especially tanks?

If we think it cold,  ISIS on the ground is facing an outmatching armor, in Iraq they fight against M1A1 Abrams and T-72Ms, in Syria they fight against T-90s, T-72Bs from advanced variants and other capable tanks, and against Turkey they are fighting against Leopard 2A4s and M-60Ts, try to battle them as equals by counterposing their own armored forces wasn’t a viable option for ISIS and so they have developed quite complex but not new antitank tactics.

The best long range AT weapon of ISIS is the ATGM, while they have operated a lot of ATGMs we can say that the 9M111 Fagot, 9M113 Konkurs and 9M133 Kornet are the most common among their forces, while missles like the Konkurs or the Kornet maybe are not able to deal at the front with the most advanced tanks like the M1A1 or the T-90 it is sure that every ISIS ATGM hitting the side will probably penetrate and cause big damage to even the most advanced tanks.

ATGM is the best AT weapon on hands of ISIS, on the image a 9M133 Kornet

At medium ranges from approximately 1.200 or less metres the best ISIS weapon is the recoilless rifle, normally a 73 mm SPG-9 but also B-10s or M40s, very effective against modern tanks if they hit them on the sides but they need a certain degree of training to be fired, in exchange they are much cheaper than ATGMs and so they can also be used against lightly armroed vehicles and infantry.

Finally at close ranges like 400 metres or less they use RPGs, normally RPG-7s but sometimes M72 LAWs or similar one-shot bazookas, also for area denial or to canalize enemy forces they employ important amounts of minefields using both conventional or DIY mines, they also employ heavy weapons like 12,7, 14 and 23 mm calibers against lightly armored vehicles and hand grenades or even antitank grenades at very close range.

The most widely used RPG, the RPG-7 is a very useful tool in hands of ISIS

Another tactic used by ISIS to engage enemy armor consist in use large concentrations of mortar fire, that is a very common tactic among profesional armies but not so common in the case of non-state actors with small amounts of ammunition at their dispposal, it has not been widely documented but on the claimed page of 15 vehicles destroyed by ISIS in Syria two or one were because of likely or confirmed mortar fire, this gives us a percentage of 7,5% to 14% by comparison the ATGMs, the most effective weapon of the Caliphate represented slightly more than 50%. The problem is that some weapons are better suited to be recorded than others and mortars are not good for that purpose because you need more than one camera and they are not as predictable and spectacular so maybe they do not appear on ISIS propaganda.

While some may ask why for example mines/IEDs are not so effective in my opinion it has a big relation with a good training because sometimes apart from the most obvious avenues of approach like roads or lanes they are not very good at identify the enemy attack directions and also they don´t have massive amounts of this kind of weapons, something very important when you want to deny areas.

Since the begin of the SCW on 2011 the use of ATGMs by every side has been very basic, normally it was a group of a few men with the launcher and the missiles who sighted and attacked an enemy force, but since the begining of 2017 we have seen an increasing refinement on the ISIS way of use of ATGMs, especially against the Turkish armor in Al-Bab.

For example let’s imagine a normal situation near Al-Bab, a formation of 4 Turkish M-60Ts is facing ISIS, M-60T is impermeable to every ISIS weapon so they must be attacked from the sides, but this unit is formed covering a big arch and so if one ATGM is shot it is very likely that one of the tanks will be able to locate the place where it was fired and open fire, from this situation arises a new necessity for ISIS, that is to strike more than one vehicle at the same time, a tactic that also leads to a bigger capability to destroy enemy vehicles because they will not have as much time to react.

We have seen a few recent double and even triple simultaneous ATGM strikes against a single unit of armored vehicles, what is a big problem to deal. This kind of attacks at the same time from different positions indicate a relatively high level of train and coordination because it requires to have previously selected the positions for more than one ATGM launcher and an officer to coordinate the action or at least pre-establish a common plan.

And that is the other point, the experience show us that ISIS has been able to correctly guess the best firing points against enemy armor and also a flexible enough force to move the scarce resources when and where they are required.

Also sometimes they use tunnels to position themselves behind the armored forces and strike them from the back where they are very vulnerable.

IEDs and mines

Daesh gathered a lot of experience about IEDs during the years of the occupation when they were normally planted on the expected roads where the foreign convoys were going to pass. There were a few types of IEDs like those using an impact fuse or those remotely activated by a phone call, also when attacking civilians, another field where AQI accumulated extensive experience, the use of artifacts with timeserver was possible.

But IEDs are not just hidden bombs but also for example DIY hand grenades used to equip their infantry.


While the use of this kind of artifacts to ambush Iraqi or Syrian forces as it was done during the occupation has had a paper during the Caliphate operations it is true that the main objective has shifted in favor of some new roles.

Fist of all when ISIS retires from a location they let it filled with hundreds of hidden booby traps used to continually produce loses to its enemies and so slowly bleed them out, also they are being used as a delay tactic to slow the enemy advance by randomly, and a lot of times hastily putting them on the likely enemy avenues of approach.

Finally we find quite likely that they use them as a typical mean to strenght some positions by putting fields of IEDs in front of them or to canalize enemy attacks towards some pre-established kill zones.

ISIS Import Most Material for Bombs and IEDs from Turkey: CAR
ISIS field of IEDs

Antiair defense

As Oryx has stated along some very interesting articles ISIS has try a lot of things to do some damage at the air forces that harass them, some of the quite desperate actions like use D-30 guns on AA role or mount captured air-air missiles on trucks to use them as AA platforms have been an obvious fail and they are just intern psychological medicine to show their population and troops that they have specific AA units dedicated to shoot down jets while their true effects are null.

However the ISIS inventory of AA weapons consist of 12,7 mm, 14,5 mm, 23 mm, 37 mm and 57 mm machine guns and guns along with some MANPADs and a few ZSU-23-4 Shilka AA vehicles.

All of those weapons are effective against low flying aircrafts, but specially against helicopters because the jets normally don`t fly so low, for example the AA machine guns may have ranges as much as 2,5 km, 57 mm guns well managed  may have a range of about 4 km and MANPADs depending on the model 6 km approximately.

ISIS ZPU-2 double 14,5 mm machine gun on a technical, the recoil of this kind of armament mounted on cars might lead to an important lose of precision

This kind of material just allows for a close point AA defense situating the armament around the objective to protect it, however if they want to give a certain AA cover to some units who are likely to receive helicopter attacks the use of MANPADs AA units mounted on highly flexible civilian vehicles is probably their best option, especially when considering how scarce those weapons are, also the distribution of a few men armed with MANPAD forming a triangle may let them cover bigger areas, but if this consists just in one MANPAD units without coordination with the other ones their efficency must be very low especially considering the very low fly and use of countermeasures by modern helicopters, what makes aircrafts even harder targets for the MANPADs.

While in theory mos of this material is probably near the front close to the expected areas to be attacked by enemy helicopters it is very likely that some important fixed objectives or even important persons of ISIS get a point AA defense protection against possible raids of the Western Special Forces who will normally employ helicopters to go at the back door of ISIS letting those helicopters relatively exposed to this kind of systems.

In the other hand while a ZSU-23-4 vehicle could be relatively effective at close range defense if it is not able to use its radar it is nothing else than a self-propelled ZSU-23-2 and as happens with heavier AA systems ISIS has not been able to operate those radars.

Since the very first moment was obvious for everyone that ISIS wasn’t going to be able to defeat an air force but below that it is true that they have been able to shoot down a few helicopters.

This modern Iraqi Mi-35M was destroyed by an ISIS FN-6 MANPAD

Evolution: The egg wants to be a condor

While the first archaic origins of ISIS are even before 2003 it was after the US invasion of Iraq when the group grew up, especially since Al-Zarqawi took its lead until he was killed on 2006, during that time Al Qaeda Iraq, as they were known, adopted extremely violent methods and at a certian degree the way of think of that epoch  has influenced the current ISIS lack of diplomacy derived from their radical think and actions.

Around 2011 the organization was badly wounded so they decided to begin a new “policy” based on attack prisions to liberate religious extremists and recruit them fot the group, later they also took advantage of the Syrian Civil War that had started on 2011 it is possible that during the first moments they acted as a moderate group to get financial and material support something that worked for some time.

But during 2013 the group took off his mask and occupied Raqqa and a big part of East Syria by expulsing the rebels and the Kurdish and again using very violent methods, this provided them with a huge amount of material, territory and population, at this point the true Islamic Caliphate was bornt, but it wasn’t until the summer of 2014 when ISIS made use of their penetration among Iraqi sunnies to hugely defeat the Iraqi Army around Mosul, a victory that was related to the sunnie disenchantment with the sectarian shia politics from Baghdag and an excellent use of psychology during the battles by ISIS.

When the victory over Mosul was completed ISIS was in full expansion of its power, its territories and above all their army.

They sewed a new army in a brief period of time, while it was still based in light infantry and guerrilla material and philosophy they get huge amounts of APCs, IFVs artillery and tanks what lead to the creation of the first armored and mechanized units, birefly they captured the next heavy material:

  • Artillery: D-30, M198, D-74, D-44, D-20 guns
  • Tanks: Their core is comprised by T-54/55 and Type 69 (a Chinese copy of the last) while also a few T-62s and T-72s are part of their forces, they also captured M1A1 Abrams, M-60Ts and Leopard 2A4s but they decided to destroy them because of their complexity and other reasons.
  • APC: BTR-80s, MT-LBs, M-113s, M117s, Humvees, MRAPs
  • IFV: BMP-1s

Apart from that they also captured huge numbers of personal equipment, ammunitions and light weapons, including mortars, ATGMs and recoilless rifles.

ISIS MT-LB and M-113 both APCs used by the group in Iraq

This new DIY combined arms force comprised some conventional artillery, tanks, APCs, survelliance drones, guerrilla motorized infantry units using technicals… While for example a typical T-55 is an outdated tank with a relatively bad armor unable to resist most of the AT weapons on the battlefield they still offer protection against most of the weapons. For example the Kurdish weapons available to penetrate a T-55 would be just their RPGs, their few ATGMs and their recoilless rifles.

The low availability of those AT weapons and the lack of training and experience on their use led to easy ISIL victories by even using outdated tactics from WWII, also the combination of tanks as rams along with the technicals to provide fire support and the dismounted infantry to assault positions was a strong capable force for the Syrian standards.

At that time the violent ISIS methods provoked an international response that led to rearm the Iraqi army, send Western forces and suit a strong air coalition able to make a lot of damage to ISIS, from the military point of view the violent ISIS methods provided them with some advantages and disadvantages:

  • Advantages: it gave them international fame and in terms of radical sunnism it means that they became the beacon for the yihadis around the world and their supporters, also when their enemies were not surrounded they tended to runaway in certain situations thanks to the psychological impact of the very violent ISIS actions spreaded by their excellent propaganda media and the local support of part of the population.
  • Disadvantages: all of those advantages gave them fast victories but it also meant that when a force was completely surrounded or it was composed of non-arab or non-sunnie groups they tend to fight fiercely making ISIS advance much harder thanks to their pitiless diplomacy. Also their declarations and acts activated a strong international response that ultimately was vital to defeat ISIS, of course the main element was the air coalition leaded by USA that was able to provide tactical support to Kurdish and Iraqis on the ground and even do damage in the deep of ISIS structure. Also they even get some unnecessary enemies among radical sunnie groups with whom they could have get agreements.

When this final step happened the pressure from the air coalition but also from the SyAF and the RuAF forced them to adapt to a new kind of warfare where they were been continuously harassed from above and so the use of their new hardware was more difficult and required more caution decreasing its effectiveness forcing them to adopt new tricks and tactics.

When ISIS arrived to Syria it was an Iraqi group with around 2.000 fighters, but one year later they controlled a big part of Syria and Iraq with a few tens of thousands of troops and plenty of heavy material, while explain this growth is difficult we think that some reasons are related to the calling effect of their victories among local populations and a intelligent diplomacy towards yihadi groups both from outside and inside Syria and Iraq what ultimately allowed to the creation of a big army in a short period of time able to defend very distant fronts against multiple enemies.

The individuals


The suicide bomb vehicles are used as a second artillery to produce a first shock before the main echelon assaults the position or as a ram against an entrenched force or a strong point, but the suicide drivers are a relatively expensive and limited weapon on hands of ISIS and so they are probably assigned to a unit depending on its mission and with a pre-stressed amount of VBIEDs at disposal giving the field commander a silver bullet to be used during the critical moments of the battle.

The experience of ISIS with VBIEDs was gathered during the insurgency against USA but those VBIEDs where relatively unpowerful and badly protected in comparison with the threat that we are facing now.

There is probably a certain high degree of centralization to on one hand recruit, brainwash and test suicide drivers and on the other hand design the vehicle to be used and the explosives to fill it.

A typical VBIED would be a chevy with a few hundred kilograms of payload from wich a part is deviated to add armored plates to the vehicle and so protect it from the weaponry that the enemies of ISIS are going to use desperately and in mass against it, this extra protection along with a relatively high speed (probably superior to 100 km/h) make these artifacts a big threat on the battlefield.

In comparison to Iraqi insurgency VBIEDs a typical ISIS VBIED is better protected, has less explosive payload but a bigger shrapnel effect thanks to the armor, but in the end it largely depends on the DIY deisgn
The effects of a VBIED explosion are huge, on this image we can even appreciate the expansive wave


Most units from ISIS have mortars and at a certain degree other types of DIY artillery with a low accuracy but with some level of effectiveness when used in mass.

Conventional artillery is not very common and normally it is just seen on the main offensives as a support force along with mortars, although the degree of ability to manage the artillery pieces may vary a lot between different units.

The artillery tends to be used in the same way as VBIEDs to produce a shock before the first assault or even to pound enemy positions especially to defeat some enemy resistance that may slow the main axis of advance or weak fortified positions. They have the problem that most of their pieces are not self-propelled and so they can’t follow the assaulting force at great distances because they are very exposed to enemy aircraft while being towed through the roads.

The best piece of the artillery parque of ISIS probably is the M198 155 mm US howitzer a very accurate gun able to provide a deadly firepower, but the most used piece is by far the Soviet designed D-30 light howitzer, a 122 mm gun relatively easy to manually operate and with a relative light weight perfect to be transported and even hidden from air coalition jets, also its low weight makes it suitable to be installed on platforms such as trucks meaning that ISIS has self-propelled artillery, however a civilian truck is not well suited for pieces like this and so their performance is relatively bad in comparison with military dedicated SPHs.

ISIS captured M198 gun
ISIS firing a M198 howitzer captured from the Iraqi army

While conventional artillery is assigned to units depending on ther mission and are probably part of fully dedicated artillery units it is very likely that most of the ISIS units have at least an organic mortar support group or something close to it but still it is dubious the level of  ammunition availability for this kind of weapons with high rates of ammunition expenditure.

The mortars mainly comprise they typical 81 and 120 mm calibers and as we have already told looks like every ISIS unit with certain size has its own support group based on mortars, a deadly weapon if its is well managed.


Apart from propaganda the main use of drones by ISIS has been to recognize the terrain before the offensive and probably to correct the artillery fire, so we have seen a lot of times how unarmed ISIS drones were shoot down, this is because they were doing survelliance missions a very useful tool for the ISIS military planners.

The appearance of ISIS armed drones is quite recent and as it could be consider by some as a mere psychological weapon in my opinion is just another weapon with a big psychological impact but also with some level of capacity to help ISIS wear out its enemies by its massive use and with an increasing level of menace, especially to unarmored vehicles transporting ammunition or uncovered infantry in the open.

We are not sure about their way of use but we think that it could be a mix of direct support assigned to a unit or also they act as lonely hunters looking for opportunity victims close to an area of operations limited by its autonomy.


What is sure is that they have been trained to choose their objectives because in our opinion they are looking for open roofs on the vehicles, this is becuase their main aerial bomb is based on a 40 mm grenade with a kill ratius of 5 metres and a very small penetration capacity, so the best way to use it consist on hit somewhere open with a lot of explosives on it, like Humvees  but also tanks with the hatch open, a tactic that in spite of be quite homely  has proved effective and at a low degree can be considered as another anti armor ISIS weapon.

Also it has some advantages like the low cost of civilian drones and the operators training, and also the cheap ammunition used of course if they face EW equipment they have no chance, but an even bigger force of drones might be the backbone of a low-cost terrorist air force that must not be underestimated.

Snipers, sharpshooters and designated marksmans

The use of snipers (or similar ones) by Iraqi insurgency groups is not new, when they were facing the West superior firepower most tactics shifted to hit & run because it denied the Western to make use of their superior firepower by calling air support and so between these hit and run tactics the sniper played an important role as it was able to do deadly shots from the distance and stay undiscovered.

Generally speaking some of the most common long range rifles on ISIS hands are the U.S M24 using a 7,62 x 51 mm cartridge, the Mosin Nagant using a 7,62 x 54 R cartridge and the king of the popularity, the mythical SVD Dragunov or its foreign copies.

As an idea of their potential the SVD series are accurate enough at around 700 to 800 metres on hands of experienced snipers and with a powerful scope magnification.

ISIS sniper unit aremd with different versions of the Russian SVD rifle

Snipers are assigned to the units more as sharpshooters than as snipers to support the forces during the attack or for attrition tactics along with IEDs or so inside urban environments.

A very typical combo is the usage of snipers along with IEDs in abandoned towns, for example when ISIS forces left Sinjar to the Kurdish they let it filled with booby traps and a few snipers to produce some more casualities to their enemies a very efficient cost/effective way to deny the complete control of some area to the enemy and make him divert some sources to it.

Also it must be said that the camouflage knowledge of the main part of the ISIS snipers is quite basic being reduced to some mimicry, also a lot of times they act as anti light armor by using high caliber sniper rifles like the Sayyad-2 able to penetrate Humvees, M117s, M-113s and other light armored vehicles.

Technicals & DIY vehicles

Technicals or as we can call them “gunneds” essentially are civilian SUVs or trucks with a weapon mounted at its back for direct fire support, normally those weapons have no plating and they usually mount the next weapons:

  • MMGs and assault rifles: sometimes on some vehicles they add firing ports to let the troops inside open fire with its light weaponry, a good improvement while doing mounted attacks.
  • HMGs: DShKM 12,7 mm, and KPV, ZPU-2 or ZPU-4 of 14,5 mm
  • AA guns: ZU-23-2 double automatic gun of 23 mm, 57 mm S-60 guns on trucks and sometimes even 37 mm M1939 guns or their Chinese copies.
  • Recoilless rifles: this is not a common upgrade but when it exists normally uses a U.S M40 of 105 mm mounted on a jeep, this upgrade means a lot because it is thought to be used as a tank hunter by fastly moving to a position an effective tactic against badly trained tank crews.

But sometimes they directly design absolutely new and huge vehicles that I call gunned castles which add a lot of bulletproof plates and a few levels with HMGs mounted on them what creates very strange combinations that remind us to some WWI vehicles. Their objective is to safely transport as much fighters as possible while at the same time those vehicles provide a great suppressive fire in all directions, something vital during frontal attacks on a plain.

Look at this monstrosity, T-72 chassis, cage armor, two levels, one turret, two HMGs, one DShKM (12,7) and one KPV (14,5)

In the end we can say that gunneds are the IFVs of the poor and because they are put on good platforms like civilian Toyota pick ups they have a good mobility, a good cross country ability, a low logistic footprint and a high reliability, something vital in combat situations.

Chemical warfare

From all of the abilities deployed by ISIS on the battlefield the more complex at the moment by far is the use of chemical weapons in limited amounts, while we are not sure if it has been done by trained fighters or by a grave recklessness this is a worrisome issue.

While the use of chemical agents by ISIS has been limited unfortunatelty we can not say that it has been anecdotic nor ineffective.

Most likely all agents came from captured Syrian and Iraq installations where those weapons were already produced and storaged.

But chemical weapons have several things to be known  and considered  before use them, like direction and speed of the wind, humidity, concentrations needed of the agent to both incapacitate or kill, the use of the precursor substances from the binary system and the dispersion vehicle/weapon to be used what is not an easy ability for an originally guerrilla group.

The ability of ISIS to produce operative chemical weapons is very unlikely so their capacity on this field is closely related to the amount of ready to use ammunitions captured in Syria and Iraq and the level of availability of the dispersion vehicles.

Black circles mean places where documented ISIS chemical attacks have been confirmed

If we take a look at IHS map where 52 confirmed chemical attacks by ISIS have been documented we can see that most of them have taken place against Kurdish both from Iraq and Syria, in our opinion this could be related to a correct ISIS think about the lower readiness of Kurdish against this kind of weapons especially because in theory they haven’t get NBC equipment and training so they are very exposed to gases. Also the use of the agents tends to be more psychological than tactical.

At the moment the degree of mortality reached suggests the use of some common chemical agents like the sarin, the chlorine or the mustard gas, the three present in the Syrian inventory, but fortunately none of those is one of the “top tier” gases of the Syrian government which are the tabun and the VX. From those agents on hands of ISIS the sarin is by far the most powerful.


Of couse the different weapons of ISIS may require different trainings but above all a light infantry training is probably the one that ISIS has been mainly providing, this comprises the use of assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, RPGs, basics about movements, fire and maneuver, camouflage, orientation, close combat, basic field fortifications…

Some normal units probably get a specialized training about ATGMs, artillery, snipers, MANPADs, mortars, recoilless rifles and in certain occasions about armored vehicles.

A big part of ISIS comprising experienced yihadis do not need training and also a big part of the local militias supporting them are badly equiped and not very trustable so they probably don’t receive a good preparation.

Finally the core of their recently erected force comes from people and volunteers recruited inside and outside the Caliphate, then they are probably classified, most of them have no military experience but a few may have done the military service or even have served in Syrian or Iraqi army and so they could have very valuable experience as mechanized infantry, light infantry or tanks, if so they may receive new specific training and been sent to those especial units.

It is very likely that most of the light infantry training and especially that locally recruited is trained at its own Wilayat to take advantage of their known of the terrain, society and climate, but this arises the question about their training standards.

We have seen how pupils from ISIS held territory get some ISIS-edited books, so if it has happen at the educational level it is very likely that it has also happened at the military level and so they have produce their own brief and adaptative military manuals for the training camps and their instructors.

ISIS edited English book for their pupils

Unfortunately we don’t have much information about ISIS training and especially about their local recruiting system, their training philosophy or the duration of the instruction phase.

Deductions about their military organization

The main civilian administrative unit of ISIS is the governorate (Wilayat) with a governor and his subordinates and advisors.

The growth of ISIS was too large and too fast, especially in the case of  Syria where they were not as present as in Iraq before 2013, their fast evolution adding groups of globalist yihadis, Chechens, Iraqis and Syrians in both scenaries with huge fronts comprising deserts and towns, desertic and mediterranean climate, and been  facing very different threats including Iraqi Kurdish, Syrian Kurdish, rebels from Syria, Turkish supported forces, SAA, Iranian militias etc could not have been done without a great level of decentralization, but the problem arrives when we try to decide what is the true level of military decentralization.

Let’s take the defense of Al-Bab as an example, was it just a defense organized by the corresponding Wilayat or there was a declared  theatre of operations charged to one commander independent from the Wilayat? In our opinion the tactical defense in normal situations is mainly responsability of a Wilayat and its commander by providing most of the resources needed to successfully accomplish the mision, while there must be a certain degree of coordination with the Central HQ to apply for new resources and some big strategic or operational operations are prepared by the Central HQ that sends specific elite units and commanders to the area.

Outdated map of ISIS Wilayats

There could be a high level of central control over some especial units like tanks, conventional artillery, suicides, drones, highly experienced fighters from outside or MANPADs to be provided at critical moments. At first look we may think that with the increasing pressure of air supremacy the movements may have get more difficult and so the move of fighters and material from the Central HQs in Mosul or Raqqa at distant places is very risky, but this is probably mitigated by placing the bases and training camps near the most likely operational theatres, by this way the Central HQ just would need to give the orders and the especial units would be relatively close to their destinations and so the possibility of been caught by enemy aircraft largely decreases.

Also it is very likely that apart from the political orders and some basic military instructions the autonomy about planning and acting in the battlefield is very high and especially in everything referred to warfare material, for example the Chechens units probably retain a certain degree of autonomy in the battlefield and they buy or get their own weapons from loot, black market or ISIS arsenals at their will.

Finally ISIS presents us a very monolithic and solid image but would be interesting to know how the hierarchy works among different human military groups like Chechens, tribes, Syrians or Iraqis because the existance of so much differences among those groups that sometimes are even lobbies inside ISIS can make the Caliphate much splitted than we actually think.

I would like to especially thanks to Historico for his excellent article about the use of tanks by ISIS and also to Purple Olvie for his excellent work about ISIS VBIEDs and to Oryx for his nice cover of some ISIS battles in its blog.

You can help me to do more articles by donating me some money via paypal here.

If you want to contact me for questions or to write an article for you, you can contact me on minstertipo@gmail.com orat my Twitter account @MinsterTX.


Made on the Caliphate Attack Drones: Brief Analysis of the Threat

Along 2016 and 2017 have emerged images and videos showing us an exponential increasing use of drones as attack platforms by ISIS and some rebel groups in Syria and Irak, on this article we are going to treat the evolution we have been able to see in their use their capabilities and the projectiles designed by Islamic State.

At first drones were used just for propaganda to record images from above, lately they were used for reconnaissance and intelligence and finally following the logical development  ISIS used them on ground attack role.

How threaty they are?: Knowing their secret weapon

At first ISIS used them as SVBIEDs but with not a very high effectiveness, for example on the New York Times on October 2016 was stated: “Of the three known drone attacks in Iraq, only the one involving the Kurdish soldiers caused casualties. “The explosive device inside was disguised as a battery — there was a very small amount of explosives in it, but it was enough to go off and kill them[…]”.

The relatively low degree of effectiveness is related to the relatively cheap series of drones available for ISIS and their small payload capacity.

Normally civilian drones are designed for especific missions and most of them are not designed to wear big payloads as ISIS needs, still they offer a safety space between the capability of the engines and its total weight letting ISIS install relatively small explosives and devices on them.

On December 2016 in the besieged city of Deir ez Zor the pro-Assad forces were able to down two ISIS drones by presumably using some kind of electronic warfare equipment, both drones can be seen on the images below.


Both are civilian drones, the first uses a PG-7V and the second an improved PG-7VM warhead. These ones were rocket-propelled grenades originally intended to be fired from the Soviet rocket launcher  RPG-7  with multipurpose capability, and they are able to penetrate more than 20 cm of armor (RHA) or to roughly create an explosion like that of a hand grenade but more powerful.

A PG-7 warhead alone would weight around 1 kg but it would also need a dropping mechanism if it is a tactical support drone, or even a phone or a special device to make the SVBIED exploit at the desired moment unleast the plan is launch the drone straight to the target and make the impact fuze exploit, what could be a difficult task.

While we are not sure if those drones were intended to be SVBIEDs or to be support attack drones they were using typical war material from the region adapted to their new purpose, in spite of use especially designed projectiles.

On November 2016 Conflict Armament Research documented some interesting DIY ” Made in the Caliphate” mortar round fashion artifacts, as can be seen on the images below.

We have calculate that the lenght and the radius of the cylinder containing the explosive must be 4,5 and 1,85 cm approximately



The projectile is formed by five elements: (5) The plastic tail designed to gain stability and so accuracy during the flight (4) The main part of the body is united to the tail and made of the same plastic, it is cylindical and inside (3) it is the manufactured explosive  mixture, (1) then it is the pin point steel plain impact fuze and (2)  it also has an ingenious safety system by using a pin that needs to be removed to get the projectile armed.


Behind these artifacts there is a much bigger project that includes design, production, know-how and testing, what tells us a lot about ISIS State-like capabilities, but still if we have a closer look to some of them we will see that they are not mass pruced but manufactured because their lines are not equal and perfect on every product, we may call this kind of middle way between DIY and industrial product a “DIY/2”.

We have been able to make a rough estimation of the explosive inside the projectiles on the images above, and they have a volume of 40 to 70 cm3 to be filled with an ISIS produced DIY/2 explosive mix with less power than a military one.

Conflict Amamente Research show us on its excellent document  that ISIS has been able to produce plastic fuzes so, why do not use those on these artifacts?. In my opinion when the projectile is falling it is good for the accuracy that most of the weight is on the nose where the fuze is and so if the projectile is so light a fuze composed of steel has a great advantage over a plastic one providing the desired “nose-falling” effect.

Also some may think that this looks like a DIY/2 mortar round, but this can not be true because the “projection cartridge” (as we call it in Spanish) needed to fire a mortar round would destroy the whole projectile if it was made of plastic.

Finally if we compare the ISIS designed projectiles with the adapted PG-7s we will find out that for every PG-7 at least 3 ISIS projectiles probably can be carried by a drone, but to attack an armored vehicle, even like a humvee, just a PG-7 can be effective so If I were a terrorist I would use PG-7s against highly protected targets while ISIS projectiles against enemy exposed infantry or unprotected vehicles. In the end even a M1 Abrams hasn’t got protection enough on the roof to deal with a PG-7.

Soviet RPG-7 along with a PG-7V (green) and a PG-7VM (black) both used on ISIS drones and very popular warheads in the world

But here comes the other question: Accuracy.

These drones can fly very high but if it is too high they can loose a lot of autonomy and also their payload is very low so there is no possibility to install even some kind of primitive aim device so everything must be done literally by the eye of the operator. If conditions are good without wind nor rain and the altitude is low, I would say no more than 100 metres, a well trained operator might be able to calculate with some precision the dropping, but if we are speaking of a PG-7 warhead not designed to fall from the sky it is very probable that the operator needs to send the drone as a SVBIED straight to the target in order to let the fuze of the PG-7 impact on the target.

Let’s have a closer look to another recently released ISIS video, on this one we see another civilian drone, some claimed that it was one called “X8 Skywalker” while I don’t think it is this model probably they are quite similar products, so for example there is a video on Youtube of a flying X8 that goes extreme and flies at an altitude of 5.341 metres!. Also its payload can be as much as 2 kg, and its price is around 180$ to 250$. This could be considered as a representative example for a typical ISIS  drone.

View from the camera of a X8 drone
ISIS drone with two small bombs, it is possible that they were inert and were used just to record the propagandistic part of the video



On the images above we see more interesting projectiles, in this case the drone mounts two artifacts, one per wing, and they are composed by a similar tail of that of the projectile treated above.

ISIS produced projectile being dropped

In the case of the artifact used on the attack while we can’t know its size I would say that it has a similar white plastic tail as other ISIS designs while in this case it is coupled with what looks like a 40 mm grenade typical from Western grenade launchers or even a OG-7V HE-Fragmentation warhead designed for RPG-7s.


The ISIS projectile may use a typical Western grenade like one on this image. A normal HE  40 mm grenade has a weight of around 0,25 kg and a kill radius of 5 metres and so is ideally suited for the low payload capacity of a civilian drone

Also when this artifact exploits just at a  few metres from a group of 5 men it produces minor injuries to two of them while heavy injuries to the other three, and this with a relatively accurate attack.

If we do a comparison, what could be the cost of an ISIS SVBIED including car, oil, the man, the explosives and the typical add on armour?. Just the car should cost several times the drone, but still both are different weapons meant for different situations. For example in my opinion every unit of ground based VBIEDs can be a very powerful tactical weapon while a few drones can be useful for a squad or a company of ISIS but not for a whole offensive, and even more if the enemy is digged in fortified areas.

Would also be interesting to see if ISIS includes thermal or infared cameras on its drones, what could be an interesting option for them.

Also I know that this is speculation, but what about the use of big formations of like 20 drones or so, a true unmanned air force ideally suited for non-state actors, maybe the combination of something we may call mini-carpet-drone-bombings could be effective in some situations, or the use of small wings of drones to attack objectives in succession looking if the first drone has succeed and sending another if not, like a true air force does. If this hasn’t happen yet it could be for two reasons: The less important is that the drones, specially those with a certain size are available for ISIS just in limited quantities, but the most important is that they would need a real training program of drone operators, what must be the real challenge for non-state actors. The money should not be an issue as far as buy for example 100 X8s might cost, going extreme, as much as 40.000$ what isn’t a problem for an organization able to earn billions of dollars every year.

I must also say that during the propagandistic video a drone was recording the other drone so it is possible that ISIS has some ability operating at least small groups of drones simultaneously.

It is obvious that the drone on the image was recorded by another drone

Finally I would like to say that new imaginative and unpredictable tactics using bigger drones formations could be expected if ISIS has time enough.

They are vulnerable

Teach the ground soldiers to fire at the drones could be okay if they are able to mass enough muzzles firing and there is no risk of betray their positions to other ISIS weapons like mortars, but still it is a relatively costly measure. From my point of view the best way to deal with them would be to make troops aware of the threat and so survey the sky and hide when they see or hear something.

Finally as equipment especially designed to combat drones we should not forget that these are civilian drones with badly protected links between the machine and the operator and so they are very vulnerable to minimum electronic warfare countermeasures so apart from specialized EW units I think that the use of relatively cheap devices designed to inhibit the link between the operator and the machine could be enough to effectively deal with the increasing threat that apparently drones possess on the hybrid battlefield.

¿Por qué al-Bukamal?

Read this article in English

Al-Bukamal es una ciudad siria situada en la rivera sur del río Éufrates junto a la frontera entre Iraq y Siria, se supone que en 2012 estaba poblada por algo más de 100.000 habitantes.

al-Bukamal, primera ciudad siria tras cruzar la frontera iraquí

Toda el área situada entre el sureste de Deir ez Zor y el desierto del este de la provincia de Homs, por su poca población y su gran distancia respecto a las áreas más candentes de la guerra de Siria han hecho que esta zona no haya sufrido grandes combates, sino más bien pequeños raids o escaramuzas decisivas que han determinado quién controlaría la zona.

Desde finales de 2015 lleva operando en las áreas menos pobladas del desierto de las gobernaciones de Deir ez Zor y Homs un grupo llamado NSA (Nuevo Ejército Sirio) un grupo apoyado, entrenado y armado por Jordania y Estados Unidos para enfrentarse a EI en estas áreas en las que hasta ahora no había encontrado gran contestación.

Desde el punto de vista operativo el NSA es una mezcla de tres elementos, fuerzas especiales, infantería ligera y fuerzas de milicia:

  • Realizan las misiones propias de las SF al llevar acabo raids nocutnos, golpes de mano, así como operaciones de reconocimiento que incluyen la posibilidad de solicitar apoyo aéreo o artillero
  • Tienen el entrenamiento propio de la infantería ligera, obviamente no tienen un entrenamiento de tanta calidad como el de las SF, pero sí se trata de infantería ligera diseñada para aprovechar su movilidad y flexibilidad en el desierto y de esta forma alcanzar sus objetivos aún enfrentándose a fuerzas superiores en número y medios
  • Son similares a casi cualquier fuerza de milicia de Siria en el sentido de que el grueso de su equipamiento lo compone armamento ligero, vehículos Toyota siendo lo más pesado que operan sistemas de ATGM o morteros de 120 mm.

Durante el 28 y 29 de junio de 2016 se produjo una escaramuza de corta duración entre elementos del NSA y de EI en los que el primero sufrió una pequeña derrota. Si tiene más interés en conocer la batalla le recomiendo el artículo de @RaoKumar.

Sin embargo lo que aquí nos interesa como reza el título del artículo es ¿por qué el NSA y sus patrocinadores eligieron concentrar sus más bien escasos recursos en al-Bukamal y no en cualquier otro lugar? ¿que importancia tiene dicha localidad?

En primer lugar al-Bukamal es la llave siria a la carretera N4 que recorre toda la rivera sur del Éufrates sirio desde la frontera con Iraq hasta el lago Assad, bañando a su paso las importantes ciudades de Deir ez Zor, Raqqa y Taqba, una zona por la que discurre la columna vertebral de Daesh.

Más aún en noviembre de 2015 los kurdos conquistaban la estratégica localidad de Sinjar, clave para controlar la carretera 47 que era la que permitía la comunicación directa entre las dos capitales de EI, Mosul, su capital en Iraq y Raqqah, su capital en Siria.


De esta forma la comunicación entre Mosul y Raqqah pasó a  ser realizada a través de una vía mucho más larga siguiendo alguna de las carreteras que desde Mosúl se dirige hacia al sur y posteriormente se dirige al punto de paso en la frontera Iraq-Siria y ¡o sorpresa! justo al otro lado de la frontera entre Siria e Iraq nos encontramos con la ciudad de al-Bukamal.

La operación del NSA con toda probabilidad estaba dirigida a controlar el tráfico rodado entre las partes siria e iraquí del califato, poniendo así la guinda al pastel que comenzó a elaborarse en Sinjar.

Pero la importancia de este enclave no acaba ahí, ya que cuando Raqqah o Mosul caigan (y una lo hará ates que la otra) es probable que los esfuerzos pasen a concentrarse en la capital restante, y cuando por ejemplo los yihadistas procedentes de una supuesta Mosul conquistada quisieran ir a Siria ¿por donde pasarían?. Desde luego una de las posibilidades sería de nuevo al-Bukamal, lo que nos hace pensar que cuando se produzca una retirada de una de las partes del califato hacia la otra el NSA incluso con el apoyo de fuerzas especiales occidentales podría tratar de controlar esta estratégica localidad para “pescar” a cuantos terroristas en retirada se pueda.

Pero la importancia de al-Bukamal no acaba aquí.

En octubre de 2008 se produjo una operación por parte de la Task Force 17 de las fuerzas especiales en al-Sukariya, en el norte de al-Bukamal, en Siria (fuente). Allí las fuerzas especiales mataron a Abu Ghadiya, un “facilitador” para el paso de yihadistas desde Siria a Iraq para AQI (recordemos que Estado Islámico antes de serlo fue AQI).

El hecho anteriormente narrado no es más que una anécdota. Lo cierto es que había tres grandes rutas denominadas “caminos de ratas” que durante los años de la insurgencia iraquí contra EEUU eran usados por Al Qaeda para hacer llegar a combatientes voluntarios a través de los mentados caminos que pasaban por Siria y Jordania. Es probable que dichas rutas fueran utilizadas en general para llevar a cabo toda clase de actividades ilegales relacionadas con el contrabando, el mercado negro de armas y por supuesto los grupos insurgentes asentados en Iraq.

Y aquí es donde de nuevo entra en juego al-Bukamal, ya que con toda probabilidad no es un área desconocida para Daesh, que cuando operaba en la sombra como organización criminal probablemente mantuvo importantes intereses en el área. De nuevo, si los enemigos de EI en Iraq o Siria alcanzan la frontera EI probablemente no desaparecerá, sino que se reconvertirá en una fuerza insurgente de guerrilla que probablemente necesitará conservar una cierta infraestructura humana en ciudades fronterizas clave como al-Bukamal para poder mover dinero, armas, hombres y cualquier otra clase de medios, de ahí la importancia no sólo de gobernar, sino de controlar al-Bukamal para evitar esta clase de tráfico ilegal a uno y otro lado de la frontera.

Fuente principal:

Autor: Leigh Neville Título original: Special Forces: In the war on terror

Golpe de mano de Estado Islámico


He hecho un vídeo sobre este mismo tema.

En este artículo voy a tratar de demostrar la profesionalidad y meticulosidad de los ataques rápidos de Estado Islámico mediante un análisis muy profundo desde el punto de vista táctico de uno de los pocos vídeos en que se nos muestra un golpe de mano completo de este grupo contra un pequeño fortín custodiado por el ejército iraquí y que probablemente se encontraba en la frontera con Siria.

El vídeo entorno al que girará todo este artículo es este y fue publicado a principios de 2013. En concreto la parte que yo voy a analizar comienza en el 00:00:22 y acaba en el 00:03:12. Os recomiendo echarle un vistazo antes de continuar la lectura.

Antes de nada cabe decir que la unidad mínima de combate de Daesh se llama “Fassil” que equivaldría a un escuadrón motorizado. Habitualmente está compuesto por tres todoterrenos Toyota de los que uno se encargaría de las funciones logísticas.

Este tipo de unidad se compondría de unos 10 hombres armados con rifles de asalto, ametralladoras, lanzacohetes y granadas de mano.

El plan

La operación del vídeo es lo que militarmente se conoce como “golpe de mano”, que se define como aquella acción ofensiva de alcance limitado tanto en cuanto a sus objetivos como en cuanto al tiempo disponible, y que se realiza por unidades de pequeño tamaño.

En este caso el objetivo es un fortín rodeado por un terraplén que hace las veces de muro, con una garita de cemento, y dos humvees, así como una guarnición de entre cinco y diez hombres.

Los principios generales aplicables a un ataque de estas características son tres:

  • Sorpresa: mantener al mínimo la alerta y prevención de los defensores hasta que el asalto por su propia naturaleza se descubra a si mismo
  • Rápido: una unidad de menos de 10 hombres no puede mantener una lucha larga por tanto debe alcanzar sus objetivos en el corto plazo o retirarse antes de que puedan llegar refuerzos
  • Violencia: es imprescindible aplicar la mayor intensidad y potencia de fuego posible en el corto espacio de tiempo para doblegar a los defensores y no darles tiempo a organizar la defensa o recibir refuerzos

A continuación existen dos requisitos previos para preparar adecuadamente el golpe de mano:

  • Observacion: consiste en observar las costumbres de la guarnición, sus puntos débiles y sus puntos fuertes, a que horas hay mayor guardia etc
  • Reconocimiento: requiere de un mayor acercamiento a la posición en sí, comprobar si puede haber elementos no apreciables únicamente mediante la vista, como minas, puntos camuflados, trincheras, el comportamiento habitual de los vigilantes respecto a los coches que pasan por la carretera etc

Además en este ataque en concreto se aprecian varios elementos particulares:

  • Enmascaramiento: los yihadistas se acercan en coches Toyota de tipo “civil”, es decir no es la típica “pick up” que usan los terroristas y que lleva un arma pesada montada. Esto es porque probablemente buscan pasar desapercibidos hasta que estén a la altura del fortín, y en ese sentido han estado dispuestos a renunciar a la potencia de fuego que podría proporcionar una de esas “pick up” con un arma montada
  • Falta de vigilancia: gran parte del éxito de este ataque se debe a que los propios defensores a raíz de la falta de disciplina o de entrenamiento no mantenían una guardia adecuada de tal forma que esto facilitó enormemente el golpe de mano
  • Amanecer: da idea de lo meticuloso de la preparación del ataque el que este se realice en un momento en que por la luz se aprecia que parece cercano al amanecer o el mediodía. Durante esas horas el ser humano por naturaleza tiende a estar más relajado y con un nivel de alerta menor

Además conviene que hagamos un inventario del material que utilizan los asaltantes:

Hay dos coches Toyota, de ellos salen entre 7 y 8 hombres de los que uno se dedica a grabar. Se aprecia el lanzamiento de lo que parece un RPG-7 aun que no se aprecia dicha arma en todo el vídeo. También llevan una ametralladora rusa PK y el resto de hombres usan diferentes versiones de rifles de la saga Kalashnikov. Por último portan algún tipo de explosivo casero a modo de granada de mano.

Granada de mano casera usada por los asaltantes

El RPG-7 podría ser muy útil para producir un efecto similar al de la artillería, provocando confusión y caos. También podría ser útil para dejar fuera de combate a los humvees o para destruir posiciones reforzadas con cemento como las garitas.

La ametralladora PK proporciona un volumen de fuego superior a cualquier otra arma, no obstante en una operación de distancias tan cortas este tipo de armas no resultas de tanta utilidad.

Los rifles Kalashnikov a pesar de no ser ingeniería fina sirven perfectamente para un asalto en que las distancias son inferiores a los 20 metros. Por último las granadas de mano sirven para limpiar posiciones en las que los defensores se puedan atrincherar.


El plan parece dividirse en tres fases:

  1. Ataque por los flancos: al comienzo del vídeo se aprecia que de cada Toyota sale un grupo. Uno se dirige al flanco izquierdo donde parece estar la entrada principal, y el otro se dirige al flanco derecho. Desde sus respectivas posiciones ambos lanzan al interior granadas caseras
  2. Asalto: el momento en que entran en el propio complejo y se lanzan contra las posiciones que albergan a los soldados iraquíes
  3. Saqueo, destrucción y huida: estas fases no se muestran en el vídeo pero cabe suponerlas. Este grupo seguramente trate de hacerse con munición, armas y en general todo aquello que puedan llevarse de utilidad. Lo que no puedan llevarse lo destruirán y a continuación se retirarán a través de una ruta previamente establecida

El ataque

Los terroristas llegan en dos  todoterrenos Toyota. Cuando están a la altura del objetivo el líder da dos golpes en el techo y el conductor para. Inmediatamente empieza un fuego cruzado entre el vigilante de la garita y los atacantes. Sin embargo el fuego de los asaltantes es muy superior y mata u obliga a retirarse al vigilante.

De cada coche sale un grupo que se dirige contra el flanco derecho e izquierdo respectivamente.

Ataque por los flancos

Arrojan lo que parecen varias granadas caseras y simultáneamente disparan un cohete PG-7 que se pasa de alto,  en este momento los defensores están aturdidos, sin saber que ocurre ni cual es la situación, es posible que algunos hayan resultado muertos o heridos a raíz de las granadas caseras. Además cada uno se halla en una parte del fortín por lo que no son capaces coordinarse. Tampoco hay nadie en el interior de los humvee.

Imagen de la explosión de una de las múltiples granadas de mano caseras que fueron arrojadas al interior del fortín

Los yihadistas se lanzan al interior del fortín donde acaban por separado con los defensores que extrañamente mueren sin siquiera tener un arma cerca.

A uno de los defensores le dio tiempo para colocarse un chaleco antibalas y acercarse a un humvee, sin embargo allí fue abatido y rematado por los yihadistas.

El vídeo acaba poco después y se aprecia como una parte de los edificios del interior del fortín están ardiendo, probablemente a raíz de los propios combates y de la retirada que van a emprender los atacantes.

Probablemente de forma deliberada al retirarse los yihadistas destruyen todo aquello que pueda ser útil para el enemigo


El ataque ha sido perfectamente ejecutado, el efecto sorpresa ha sido conseguido hasta estar a la altura del objetivo, la rapidez la han dado los propios terroristas al apresurarse en sus acciones, y la violencia ha sido proporcionada tanto por el ataque en dos flancos arrojando granadas de mano como por los Kalashnikovs usados en el asalto a corta distancia.

En el momento en que han estado a la altura del fortín, justo antes de que el guardia se percatara de lo que se le echaba encima los asaltantes han abierto fuego simultánea y sucesivamente, lo que le ha obligado a refugiarse en el interior del fortín, donde seguramente ha sido vulnerable a las granadas.

Los defensores no sólo tenían una guardia insuficiente si no que su posición estaba muy expuesta al estar junto a la carretera sin ninguna clase de puesto de vigilancia avanzado o barrera que obligara a los vehículos a pararse.

Además está claro que no esperaban ninguna clase de ataque de este tipo ya que de ser así es de suponer que hubieran tomado mayores medidas y estarían prevenidos. Esto sugiere una falta de inteligencia sobre el terreno que hubiera podido alertar de un posible golpe de mano terrorista en la zona.

El hecho de que todos los defensores murieran sin un arma cerca da idea del efecto de “shock” producido por el ataque. Este es un buen ejemplo de porque la violencia y la rapidez son los principios de un golpe de mano.

Por último cabe recordar que el vídeo fue subido a youtube el 1 de febrero de 2013, por lo que podemos suponer que fue grabado entre finales de 2012 y principios de 2013. En aquel momento EI no era EI, si no Estado Islámico de Iraq y el Levante, y no controlaba ni el norte de Iraq ni el noreste de Siria y a pesar de ello ya fueron capaces de tener fuerzas organizadas capaces de atacar muy eficazmente un puesto del ejército iraquí.

Además los hombres que realizan el golpe de mano tienen que ser de nacionalidad iraquí ya que a principios de 2013 EI aún no se había expandido ni había incorporado grupos extranjeros de sirios, chechenos u otros, por lo menos no a escala de unidades de combate.

Resulta curioso que el vídeo ya tenga la marca de agua de una de las productoras audiovisuales de EI en un momento tan temprano como principios de 2013, de hecho el que graben el ataque da muestra del gran desarrollo propagandístico y la visión estratégica desde el punto de vista comunicativo que tiene y ha tenido EI desde antes de sus grandes conquistas.

Opino que este vídeo nos da una idea bastante aproximada de la forma en que EI realiza y realizaba sus ofensivas desde el nivel táctico hasta el estratégico haciendo uso de una profunda observación y preparación y aprovechándose de los puntos débiles de sus adversarios.

Organización militar de Estado islámico

Antes de nada conviene que el lector conozca la situación general de Daesh.

Os dejo aquí un enlace a una imagen que os será de mucha utilidad para entender como funciona EI, os recomiendo echarle un profundo vistazo antes de continuar. (Enlace a la imagen).

Tal y como expliqué en la serie de vídeos Organización interna de Estado Islámico” EI se ha ido formando a través de una política de adhesión de otros grupos más pequeños, así como mediante alianzas con numerosos elementos descontentos de la comunidad suní iraquí.

A su política para adherir grupos militares la llamaremos la espada y la miel, ya que para conseguir la adhesión  ha utilizado una típica mezcla de amenaza (la espada) y de oportunidad (la miel). Es decir si no te unes a mí el castigo será un peligroso enfrentamiento con nosotros, sin embargo si te unes recibirás una parte de los beneficios.

Dicha política se ha aplicado en conjunto y por separado, es decir utilizando la amenaza y la recompensa de forma simultánea o separada según el caso.

Mediante la política de la miel y la espada este grupo relativamente menor hasta 2013 consiguió que múltiples unidades militares de pequeño tamaño (normalmente no más de 2.000 hombres) se adherieran a su causa, por supuesto la posibilidad de adhesión tenía como requisito tácito imprescindible  una importante concordancia desde el punto de vista ideológico con el califato, al menos en teoría.

Ahora bien, el estatus de estos grupos dentro del propio califato es harina de otro costal. No cabe esperar que todos estos grupos se hayan diluido entre sus filas, si no que más bien se hayan adherido al mismo aceptando toda una serie de sometimientos en cuestiones políticas y administrativas a la dirección central del propio EI a cambio de mantener cierta autonomía y recibir una parte del botín de la victoria.

Por otra parte es bien sabido que existen dos fórmulas de jurar fidelidad a Daesh por parte de quienes pasan a formar parte de sus filas. Para una más fácil comprensión lo nominaremos en términos de lo que sería más cercano a nuestra cultura, el juramento y la promesa.

  • Juramento : es la fórmula de fidelidad más importante ya que vincula en mayor medida al combatiente con Daesh y su destino. Aquellos que optan por esta reciben mayores recompensas y/o botines.
  • Promesa: es la fórmula de fidelidad de menor calado ya que supone un compromiso que no impone una absoluta vinculación. Desde el punto de vista práctico quienes optan por este reciben una parte inferior de las recompensas y a cambio su nivel de autonomía es mayor.

A parte de aquellos individuos a los que se permita optar por una u otra opción, a la hora de adherir grupos enteros a su causa no parece probable que en el seno de estos sean sus miembros quienes tomen la decisión de forma individual, si no que más bien serán sus líderes quienes tomarán la decisión para todo el colectivo. Por eso seguramente encontremos diferentes status en el seno de la máquina militar de EI.

Al margen de esto hay grupos transversales, incluyendo especialmente a las tribus suníes de la provincia de Al Anbar. Sin duda la cuestión tribal es una de las que está pasando más desapercibida en los análisis de lo ocurrido en Iraq, y es posible que precisamente ahí este el quid de la cuestión.

Estas tribus son entidades semi independientes de EI, algunas se han opuesto al mismo, se han rebelado puntualmente o se han aliado con Daesh. En última instancia parece que esta última opción ha sido la más común. Esta clase de actores que a día de hoy podríamos considerar aliados del califato mantienen una gran independencia y podrían ser susceptibles de abandonarlo si la situación en el campo de batalla se deteriora lo suficiente.

Por otro lado encontramos los combatientes individuales y altamente motivados que han viajado desde numerosos países para hacer la yihad llamados por la propaganda del califato.

Con todo esto ya tenemos una imagen del fragmentado cosmos que es Daesh. Combatientes individuales, grupos adheridos por la fuerza, el miedo o la ambición y por último el núcleo duro y primigéneo que compuso EI, que incluye guerrilleros yihadistas por un lado y ex oficiales del ejército de Saddam Hussein por otro.

En este sentido las sistemáticas tácticas seguidas por EI se remiten a la experiencia de los grupos adheridos, como los chechenos, los antiguos oficiales Baasitas o su propia experiencia desde su formación en 2003 como Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) de la mano de Al Zarqawi. Este último participó en la guerra soviética de Afganistán, por lo que no es improbable que parte de las tácticas que aprendió las exportara a Iraq.

A continuación trataremos las diferentes fórmulas tácticas más o menos discernibles en los diferentes grupos.

Guerrilleros chechenos y del Cáucaso

De Chechenia procede un pequeño pero importante grupo de guerrilleros al servicio de EI. Su ideología aunque bebe del salafismo también tiene mucho que ver con el nacionalismo checheno. Están o estaban encabezados por uno de los líderes más brillantes desde el punto de vista táctico de Daesh, Omar al Sishani (georgiano) el que en numerosas ocasiones ha sido dado por muerto sin que podamos a día de hoy confirmarlo o negarlo con seguridad.

En su momento a lo largo de los 90 los chechenos se enfrentaron al ejército ruso. A raíz del enorme tamaño de las fuerzas acorazadas rusas la utilización del RPG para combatirlas  fue fundamental para plantear una resistencia organizada. Sin embargo tras perder paulatinamente la guerra a partir del nuevo milenio se vieron obligados a actuar como una guerrilla, realizando emboscadas, rápidos asaltos y golpes de mano. Gracias a toda esta experiencia cuando se trasladaron a Siria se convirtieron en una de las fuerzas más temibles.

A día de hoy son la punta de lanza del califato y tienen un cierto peso a la hora de tomar decisiones políticas.

En esta curiosa foto se observa como la señal está escrita en ruso para los combatientes chechenos

Oficiales Baasistas

Sus capacidades en el seno de EI tienen más que ver con la obtención de aliados y recursos que con la doctrina táctica en el campo de batalla, ya que de hecho la doctrina que aquellos oficiales aprendieron era extremadamente centralizada, contaba con grandes cantidades de artillería y carros y siempre procuraba hacerse con ratios de superioridad numérica muy elevados al más puro estilo soviético.

Dichas tácticas resultaban inaplicables para Estado Islámico ya que no contaba ni de lejos con los medios o conocimientos suficientes para hacerlas realidad.

No obstante es posible que si hayan bebido de ellas en el uso de la poca artillería de que disponen o a la hora de ciertas tácticas, como avanzar tras los carros de combate, táctica primitiva propia de la segunda guerra mundial pero que las fuerzas de Sadam siguieron usando en los 90.

No sería tampoco extraño que su organización logística; en el sentido más amplio del término haya sido planificada por los mentados oficiales.

Resistencia y guerrillas iraquíes a partir de 2003

Como es bien sabido tras la ocupación norteamericana de 2003 surgieron numerosos grupos guerrilleros de todo corte e ideología, entre ellos estaba uno llamado Yama al Tawid bal Yihad. Aquel pequeño grupo bajo el mando de Al Zarqawi paso a ser conocido como AQI es decir la rama de Al Qaeda en Iraq.

Participaron en emboscadas contra el nuevo ejército iraquí y las fuerzas occidentales y comenzaron a usar masivamente los chalecos explosivos, IED y VBIED para producir bajas a la coalición internacional.

Además participaron en los combates de la batalla de Faluya de 2004 donde por primera vez las fuerzas de la coalición se tuvieron que enfrentar a una resistencia decidida en un entorno urbano lo que provocó gran cantidad de bajas para lo que estaba acostumbrada.

Como ya dije Al Zarqawi estuvo en Afganistán y allí aprendió de las tácticas de emboscada de los mujahideen. A pesar de que murió en 2006 el legado de sus tácticas en mi opinión aún se aprecia.

Los mujahideen a la hora de la emboscada tenían un patrón táctico muy claro. Normalmente se dividían en tres tipologías, dos estaban casi siempre y una en ocasiones.

En primer lugar el grupo o grupos de asalto, armado principalmente con RPG, rifles de asalto Kalasnikov y granadas. En segundo lugar el grupo de fuego de apoyo que incluía normalmente ametralladoras pesadas DShK de 12,7 mm. Por último y aun que los mujaiden no solían hacer la distinción podríamos hablar de un tercer grupo de “apoyo reforzado” que podía incluir cañones sin retroceso, cohetes y morteros.

El primer combo de ametralladoras pesadas para dar apoyo y RPG, AK 47 y granadas para el asalto ha sido visto continuamente en Iraq.

La adaptación

Al fin y al cabo aun que EI ha bebido de todas las fórmulas tácticas anteriores su contexto no ha sido el mismo por lo que en ocasiones se ha visto obligado a innovar y crear otras nuevas.

Por ejemplo el uso de IED y francotiradores para cubrir la retirada de sus adeptos, tal y como vimos en la batalla de Sinjar con los kurdos, o por ejemplo el inteligentísimo uso de los medios de comunicación y la propaganda como arma psicológica que ha logrado infundir el temor y la consiguiente desbandada entre sus enemigos.

Recordemos que cuando EI lanzo su ofensiva de 2014 sobre el área suní de Iraq se calcula que con aproximadamente 3.000 hombres derrotó a los 60.000 del ejército iraquí guarnicionados en el norte de Iraq.

Un efecto parecido aun que a menor escala lograron en sus primeros avances de 2014 contra el noreste de Siria en general y la 17ª División mecanizada de reserva en particular.

Su uso de la propaganda, y el temor provocado por las decapitaciones masivas hicieron huir en masa a un ejército numérica y materialmente muy superior.

Al margen de todo esto se aprecia que el califato tiene toda una serie de tropas y unidades que conforman su núcleo duro y punta de lanza, así como toda una serie de unidades posteriormente adheridas que suelen llevar a cabo la mera defensa sin realizar ataques.

Además en cualquier caso se aprecia una estructura muy descentralizada que permite a los comandantes locales tomar las decisiones con gran flexibilidad teniendo unos objetivos claros previamente establecidos por el califa y su consejo pero sin la interferencia política que en ocasiones dificulta el desarrollo de las operaciones militares.

El consejo militar presidido por Abu Bakr al Bagdadi y acompañado por varios de los hombres más influyentes del califato determina los objetivos y medios a emplear.

En un ejército mínimamente desarrollado existe una homogeneización del material y la táctica, sin embargo la propia naturaleza de crecimiento rápido de EI imposibilita este elemento por lo que no se puede hablar de un ejército unificado, si no más bien de diversos elementos que actúan en mayor o menor coordinación en consonancia con unos objetivos dados por la dirección central.

A la hora de la planificación a mi parecer funcionan de la siguiente forma, y aviso de que esto es pura opinión.

En cada territorio administrativo existe un comandante militar que supongo deberá encargarse siempre de la defensa, y para ello utilizará las tropas que le hayan podido asignar, así como algunas milicias que pueda reclutar en la zona. Por su baja capacidad imagino que su disposición será normalmente pasiva y defensiva, aun que podría haber excepciones.

Desde la dirección de EI se toma una decisión militar encaminada a atacar u ocupar un lugar estableciéndose las condiciones generales de la misión. Dentro de este último elemento se dejará claro con que medios contará, que clase de refuerzos recibirá, las fechas en las que debe ser alcanzado el objetivo etc

Imagino que el gobierno del califato tendrá bajo su mando directo determinadas unidades de carácter especial que serían transferidas a uno u otro lugar en función de las necesidades. Me estoy refiriendo a unidades que puedan contar con artillería pesada, carros de combate, ingenieros, unidades logísticas cierto armamento antiaéreo tipo MANPADS o grandes habilidades tácticas.

Además a la hora de las decisiones parece que en ocasiones son tomadas tanto a nivel táctico como a nivel estratégico. La diferencia es que mientras en la primera la participación directa de los medios del gobierno del califato es relativamente menor, en el caso de la planificación de operaciones estratégicas a gran escala esta claro que la participación es mucho mayor.

Operaciones tácticas

Entiendo por estas aquellas operaciones militares con un período de planificación no superior a unas semanas, que en ocasiones supone una reacción a un avance táctico de sus enemigos, y que tiene unos objetivos limitados a unas pocas localidades a lo sumo.

Veamos un ejemplo, es bien sabido que a lo largo de enero y febrero de 2016 el ejército sirio apoyado por la RuAF había conseguido notables avances en la zona en torno a Alepo. De este avance lo que afectó a Daesh fue que tomaron territorios  y acabaron con el cerco de la base aérea de Kweires.

Pero ¿qué hizo Estado Islámico para detener esta ofensiva de las fuerzas de Asad?

En vez de reforzar la zona del frente de Alepo atacaron un punto mucho más débil. Si os fijáis en este mapa veréis representada en rosa la delgada y amenazada línea de comunicaciones que permite abastecer a todas las fuerzas pro Asad en el área de Alepo.

Táctica EI

Pues bien EI en vez de reforzar Alepo en sí (que suponemos que también lo hizo) atacó un punto de esta delgada y amenazada línea de comunicaciones donde se encuentra la localidad de Kanaser (marcada con una X en negro)

Además no está confirmado, pero fruto del azar o la diplomacia otros grupos rebeldes también atacaron algo más al norte de esa misma línea, lo que probablemente ha obligado a concentrar mayores esfuerzos en proteger la amenazada ruta de nuevos posibles ataques que suponen una gran amenaza.

Esta operación debió planificarse con no más de un mes de antelación y aun que la reacción del ejército sirio ha sido rápida y violenta es un buen ejemplo de la rapidez y brillantez táctica con la que EI es capaz de actuar.

Operaciones estratégicas

Entiendo por estas aquellas en las que existe una planificación superior a varios meses en la que se trata de conquistar y ocupar grandes extensiones de territorio para lo que se lleva a cabo una labor de erosión y reconocimiento encubierto de las fuerzas defensoras que se encarga de facilitar el posterior asalto.

En esta clase de operaciones el mando central del califato utiliza sus recursos para infiltrar guerrilleros y hacerse con colaboradores en la zona objetivo, de esta forma va socavando la seguridad del área. Además estudian las pautas de comportamiento diario de las guarniciones clave para la conquista total.

Una vez toda esta labor ha sido realizada los primeros asaltos seguidos de matanzas provocan un efecto de pánico entre los defensores, y es gracias a esta última fase que EI ha logrado grandes éxitos. De hecho para que cayera  Mosul se usaron los altavoces de la ciudad a modo de propaganda para afirmar que el Daesh estaba allí y lo que había hecho a los soldados del ejército iraquí. Ello unido a la huida del gobernador de la provincia y a la baja moral produjo una desbandada total y la consiguiente humillante derrota al ejército iraquí.

La ofensiva de Estado Islámico durante el verano de 2014 le permitió hacerse con buena parte de Iraq

Futuro militar del Estado Islámico

Su situación es muy complicada ya que la RuAF, las fuerzas aéreas de la coalición y la alerta propia de quien sabe lo que ocurrió en el pasado hacen muy complicada la ofensiva estratégica exitosa para EI, por lo que se ven obligados a concentrarse en alcanzar objetivos tácticos menores.

Además poco a poco las fuerzas de la región se han movilizado contra ellos, y la presión conjunta del régimen sirio, los rebeldes sirios, los kurdos y el ejército iraquí les está colocando en una situación de compromiso. Esto significa que tienen y tendrán que tomar decisiones muy arriesgadas y difíciles a cerca de defender o retirarse de lugares de gran valor propagandístico, económico y político.

Decisiones de compromiso como defender o retirarse en Mosul u otros lugares.

A esto hay que sumarle que muchos de los grupos que se unieron al califato cuando las mieles del éxito parecían rentables podrían abandonarles fácilmente, lo mismo ocurriría a título individual con los soldados que se vieron obligados a jurar lealtad al Daesh cuando no les quedaba otra opción.

Por último desde que EI controla una población amplia y estable parece que ha establecido campos de entrenamiento y quien sabe si unos rudimentarios sistemas de reclutamiento. Si una iniciativa como esta llega a ser eficaz podrán hacerse con una importante cantidad de tropas con cierto entrenamiento, conocimientos y  alta moral, justo el tipo de tropas que suelen escasear en el mundo árabe y que por ende son más útiles.

En definitiva lo que nos cabe esperar es que un EI con demasiados frentes se vea obligado a retirase en especial a sus territorios de Siria. Sus sistemas logísticos se verán cada vez con  más problemas, aún a pesar de que desarrollen ciertas estratagemas para prevenirse de los mismos.

Además su supervivencia pasará porque el equilibrio entre los contrincantes de Siria se mantenga provocando que a Bashar al Asad no le convenga una ofensiva a fondo contra EI en tanto en cuanto los países occidentales podrían decidir apoyar a fondo a los rebeldes restantes. Por otro lado las ofensivas kurdas se verán limitadas a las zonas de población kurda, así como a aquellos lugares en lo que cuenten con la garantía de EEUU de que Turquía no les atacará.

Respecto a su organización militar es probable que se resienta y a medida que las derrotas se hagan más palpables determinados grupos podrían abandonarles, en especial las tribus suníes de Al Anbar. Por otra parte sus posibilidades de paliar este elemento procederán de su capacidad para reclutar y entrenar tropas procedentes tanto del extranjero como sobretodo de Iraq y Siria.